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U sroh prosecutions 
continue 
The Musi im movement known as usroh which emerged recently 
in the southern regions of Central Java is now spreading 
northward, according to warnings that have been issued by 
the Central Java military commander. The movement takes 
its name from the Archie word, usrah, meaning family or 
close-knit group. For a full analysis, please turn to 
page 2. 
According to TAPOL records, twenty-nine usroh activists 
have been tried so far, all of them on charges of 
subversion. The sentences have been severe and there have 
been no acquittals. Other trials are currently in 
progress and more are likely to begin soon as many 
witnesses are referred to only by their initials. 
The trials so far have been concentrated in the south, 
in Klaten, Jogjakarta, Sukoharjo, Surakarta, Karanganyar, 
Boyolali, Brebes, Ngawi and Bantu!. We have monitored 
sixteen verdicts ranging from five to eleven years. Five 
men were sentenced to seven years, four were given eight 
General Murdani warns 
against communists, Muslims, liberals 
and the foreign press 
In a special briefing to provincial governors in advance 
of the general election to be held this April, General 
Benny Murdani, commander-in-chief of tre Indonesian armed 
forces, I isted communists, Musi im extremists, I iberals 
and the foreign press as the main threats to Indonesia's 
security. 
He claimed that the communists, whose party and mass 
organisations have been outlawed since 1965, were still 
the most serious threat, warning that activists from 
Eastern Europe had entered the country illegally and had 
not been captured. Moreover, during a 3-month period last 
year, nine tons of 'communist propaganda materials' had 
been seized. 
As for Muslims, there had been 'riots' in the past year 
(not reported in the press, as far as TA POL is aware) 
though 'fundamentalism' had been handled with great 
severity: Liberals were another menace. These were 
people who were "preaching human rights in order to be 
able to do whatever they I iked". 
The final bogey was the foreign media, particularly the 
Australian and US press, attack by Murdani "for 
portraying Indonesia as undemocratic and militaristic." 
Peter Hiett, BBC, reporting this latest Murdani attack 
on perceived security threats, said that his attack on 
the foreign press reinforces hints that restrictions may 
be placed on foreign correspondents who try to cover the 
elections ( BBC dispotct\ 21 January). 
years, four received six years and the other three got 
five, nine and eleven years each. The ten-year sentence 
against Sugiman al Yulianto (see T APOL Bulletin No 78) 
was reduced to seven years on appeal. 
The military authorities in Central Javo huve meanwhile 
started security operations against mosques in Semarang, 
the provincial capital, and elsewhere, on the pretext of 
rooting out usroh influence. Syafaat Habib, secretary-
generol of the Indonesian Mosque Council, while not 
daring to protest against such intrusions into places of 
worship, stressed that what goes on inside a mosque is a 
matter for the mosque committee to regulate. As for the 
military operations, he confined himself to saying that 
if usroh activities in the mosques were I ikely to 
threaten security, the authorities should act with care. 
"We hope that, if the mi Ii tary commander takes such 
measures, he wi 11 first hove carried out thorough 
investigations" (Pelita, 30 December 1986). 
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MUSLIM TRIALS 
The U sroh movement 
There is every sign that the mi 1 itury government has 
decided to step up its persecution of the usroh movement, 
a grassroots Muslim movement in Central Java. At the end 
of 1986, the Central Java military commander, Major-
General Harsudiono Hartas claimed that usroh activists 
from Solo in the south had infiltrated six mosques in 
various parts of the city of Semarang. In one of the 
mosques, "they hove recruited forty pupi Is," he said. 
Because of the spread of usroh, Semarang was now said to 
a daerah rawan, a region of instability requiring 
heightened vigilance from the security forces. (Suoro 
Merdeko, 27 December 1986 and AFP, 29 December 1986) 
In our earlier reports, we suggested that usroh might 
be o phantom created by the regime as a stick with which 
to beat Muslim activism. However, it is now clear that 
this is not the case. The usroh movement appears to have 
taken root in some parts of Central Java. What the regime 
is now intent upon doing is to cast usroh as a rebellious 
threat to the existence of the Pancasi la state in order 
to justify its crackdown on an allegedly subversive 
movement. The lowcourts ore being used to further this 
purpos~. 
What is the Usroh movement? 
The word 'usroh' is the Jovanised version of an Arabic 
word, usrah, meaning 'family' in the broader sense of a 
close-knit group of people. In the absence of any 
independent evidence and assessment of the usroh movement 
in Central Java, the following account relies on what has 
come to light during the trials and from a few documents 
that hove become available from inside Indonesia. 
The heartland of the movement today appears to be 
located in the southern regions of Central Java, on area 
far less penetrated by Islam than the north. By contrast 
with the northern part of the region which was dominated 
by trading centres along the coast (daerah pesisir) in 
the fifteenth century when Islam first penetrated Central 
Java, Javanese kebatinan beliefs retained their grip in 
the south, dominated by two Javanese feudal kingdoms with 
their seats in Solo and Jogjakarta. Hence, the division 
into santri, or devout Muslim villages, and abangan, or 
so-called 'nominal Muslim' villages was much less marked 
than in the north. 
It is today one of the most densely populated ports of 
Java where poverty is particularly widespread. Many 
districts are 'minus areas', meaning they ore incapable 
of producing enough food and suffer severe food shortages 
almost every year. 
In pre-1965 days, this southern sector of Central Java 
was t:he Communist Porty's strongest bastion, where it had 
the support of well over half the electorate. This was 
the region that was first shattered by ~he 1965-66 
massacres which followed in the woke of Suhorfo's seizure 
of power in late 1965. But uni ike East Java, where the 
army relied heavily on Muslim youth gongs to initiate and 
perpetrate the killings, in Central Java crack troops, 
under the command of the army's strategic reserve corps, 
Kostrad, of which Suharto was the commander, had to be 
brought in to slaughter villagers. In the very areas 
where 'usroh pockets' are now said to exist - in K laten, 
Boyololi, Brebes and Surakorta - the massacres were 
particularly horrendous and left deep scars on all 
communities, abangan and santri alike. It is not likely 
that these wounds have healed, even a generation later. 
Lieutemnt-Gererol Horsudiono Hortos. Tempo, 20 Septembel-
1986. 
The mi Ii tory rulers hove al ways regarded these 
impoverished regions of Central Java as a daerah rawan, 
as fertile soil for a communist revival or, as they now 
seem to think, for radical Muslim activism. Indeed, as a 
public relations exercise, the usroh trials seem to be 
directed primarily at the people of Central Java. 
Notional dailies ore devoting little attention to the 
trials as compared with papers in the province. 
From what is known about the usroh movement, it differs 
markedly from other Muslim revivalist movements in 
Indonesia. It is reformist, colling for a return to basic 
Islamic values. The movement takes its inspiration from 
on Egyptian Muslim thinker and orgonisor named Hasson Al-
Banno, founder of the original Muslim Brotherhood which 
was created on the usroh principle. It consists of small, 
grassroots groups that meet weekly for the purpose of 
reinforcing the members' desire to I ive according to the 
Quron. The groups ore seen as being port of a larger 
movement sometimes referred to as the Ichwanul Isla miyah, 
or the Muslim Brotherhood. The movement attaches great 
importance to training members on how to conduct group 
meetings and how to help members live according to the 
Quron. 
The leading exponent and apparently also the founder of 
the movement is Abu Bokor Bo'asyir, a Muslim teacher who 
was attached to the pesantren (a Musi im boarding-school 
primarily focussing on religious teachings) in Ngruki, 
near Sukohorjo in the district of Surakorto. A book 
written by him entitled Pelajaran Syariat, The Study of 
Islamic Law, is, by most accounts, the basic tract for 
usroh members. 
Ba'osyir was arrested several years ago and tried for 
links with a movement named as J em a 'ah Islam. He was 
sentenced to nine years but the sentence was later 
reduced to four years on appeal. While he was under house 
arrest awaiting the results of a second appeal, he 
apparently escaped and went into hiding though the 
circumstances of his escape hove never been mode clear. 
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His non-appearance at the usroh trials has been a major 
obstacle to testing the truth of many prosecution claims. 
Usroh group activity 
There is no way of knowing how long usroh groups have 
been functioning in Central Java, though trial reports 
suggest that the first groups were set up in 1982 or 
1983. Nor is it possible to estimate how far the movement 
has sp.read or how many people are involved, whether 
hundreds, thousands or even more. 
An usroh group is small in size, never - according to 
the guidelines - less than seven or more than fifteen. It 
generally meets in the homes of the members, each taking 
turns to host the group, and is expected to create close 
inter-personal ties and provide mutual assistance to the 
members in times of difficulty, which includes collecting 
money to help pay for marriages, funerals and the like. 
Usroh groups are expected to take an interest not only in 
religious affairs but also to devote part of their 
regular meeting to discussing matters of local interest. 
Muslim girls attending a compulsory flog-raising 
ceremony. This is the kind of state-symbol glorification 
to which the usroh movement so strongly objects. 
The movement advocates a healthy life-style by avoiding 
drinking, gambling and smoking, and undertaking joint 
cultural and physical activities. It calls on members to 
disassociate themselves from the non-Islamic institutions 
that surround them and to reject customs that contradict 
Islamic beliefs such as, for instance, paying respect to 
man-made symbols. Training courses for group leaders are 
conducted to help them understand the religious teachings 
of the movement. 
The movement q>pecrs to hove attracted people from many 
walks of life, peasants, petty traders, village teachers 
of religion and craftsmen as well as school-pupils and 
university students. 
Whi 1st none of the literature available provides any 
comment on political questions, it is not difficult to 
see that the movement is diametrically opposed to the 
sole-ideology requirements of the military regime. It 
clearly turns its back on Pancasila indoctrination and is 
offended by the regime's obsession with national 
discipline in support of government programmes, and with 
ceremonial flag-raising and other acts of deference to 
the symbols of state. 
In the usroh trials, defendants have been accused of 
spurni~ the Pancasila as a man-made ideology inferior to 
MUSLIM TRIALS 
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Islam. Their alleged crimes include showing disrespect 
for Poncasi la indoctrination and Pendidikan Moral 
Pancasila or Education in Pancasila Morals, which is now 
a compulsory subject in all school curricula. They 
include opposing government programmes like family 
planning and transmigration. As far as can be seen from 
press reports, no-one has denied holding these views. 
Transforming piety and reformism into subversion 
What has been vigorously denied by the men on trial is 
the regime's claim that the movement is dedicated to the 
overthrow of the Pancasila state and the creation of an 
Islamic state. Another accusation .·- that the movement is 
the successor to the le ma 'ah Islam which was branded as a 
terrorist movement in trials held in the early 1980s - is 
also strongly denied. The allegations are based on 
statements drawn up during pre-trial interrogations and 
signed by defendants or witnesses. These statements have 
been used by the prosecution to make charges that usroh 
is subversive and is therefore punishable under the anti-
subversion law. 
As with other Muslim trials under way since early 1985, 
many of these highly damaging 'confessions' have been 
retracted in court. Both defendants and witnesses have 
complained that they signed these statements under 
pressure, during interrogation by army officers. The 
courts have shown no sympathy for such retractions, 
asserting that since the complainants were unable to 
identify the officers responsible or provide other 
evidence of maltreatment, their complaints cannot be 
taken seriously. In some instances, judges have even 
alleged that the retractions are illegal, threatening to 
initiate additional charges for perjury. 
Communist connections 
Signs that the army in Central Java was alleging that 
there were connections between 'Muslim fundamental ism' 
and 'communist remnants' first appeared when regional 
military commander, Major-General Harisudiono Hartas 
warned that it was "becoming difficult to distinguish PK I 
people from liberals or to tell whether they ore 
Pancasila-ists or fundamentalists. Indeed, a time will 
come when communist thinking and liberalism wi 11 merge, 
giving birth to a new fundarrentalism" (.Kedaulaton Rakyat, 
11 July 1986). 
He then compared usroh to a communist-type organisation 
- berpola kom unis - with the aim of "creating discord, 
discrediting the government and so on". It was "an 
extremist movement whose style of teaching is communist" 
( .Kedaulotm Rakyat, 23 July 1986). Hartas also said that 
an usroh leader who went into hiding had recently been 
captured. He turned out to be a "PKJ man" named Tohari 
who was expelled from a course for police officers after 
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his PK I background was discovered ( Kedaulatan Rakyat, 11 
and 23 July 1986). [His full name is Tohari Suradji who 
has been mentioned in several usroh trials and who 
appeared for the first time as a witness at the end of 
July. In aie trial he is said to have been a leader of 
the Jema'ah Islam, along with Ba'asyir.J 
Then in a statement released on 1 October 1986, the day 
on which the regime yearly celebrates its victory over 
the Communist Porty in October 1965, Soedorno, the 
Prosecutor-General for Central Java, amounced that the 
security forces had succeeded in discovering "usroh 
pockets in Brebes, Surakarta and K laten". Most of those 
captured were either memba-s of the Darul Islam or former 
soldiers and deserters from Battalion 426, he said 
( Kedaulatan Rakyat, 3 October 1986). This was the 
battalion of the Diponegoro Division in Central Java most 
severely affected by anti-communist purges in the army in 
the woke of the October 1965 affair. Many soldiers were 
dismissed and arrested, or deserted and went into hiding. 
But ex-Battalion 426 members would now be in their late 
forties or early fifties, whereas most usroh detainees 
ore from a younger generation. 
In several of the trials, defendants are said to have 
been in possession of communist literature as well as 
books about Islam, but nothing has been said in the 
courtrooms about connections with Battalion 426. Maybe, 
if Tohari is tried, more will be heard of the alleged PK l 
connect ion. 
With only limited information at hand, it is difficult 
to soy whether usroh will have the strength to withstand 
persecution by the security forces. But what is certain 
is that the army will use this new threat to justify 
continued repression in Central J ova up to and beyond the 
elections to be held in April this year. 
Two usroh trials open in Brebes 
Two trials of usroh members opened at the Brebes district 
court ai 22 December. Four men are being tried. They are 
only identified by their initials. 
'AG', 25 years old, a fourth-year student at the Social 
and Political Faculty of a university in Jogjakarta. This 
defendant is being tried separately from the other three 
who are: 
'AS', 23 years old, a shoe-repairer from Siosem 
IWGIA Document 'ST 
TRANSMIGRASI: 
Indonesian Resettlement Policy. 1965 - 1985 
1r-on .. 
vi lloge .• 
'G', 23 years old, a trader from Pebaton village. 
'R', 23 years old, a trader, also from Siasem village. 
They are all accused of being the most active exponents 
of the usroh movement in Brebes, which came into being in 
July 1986. Their teachings "oppose the foundation of the 
Indonesian state and aim to replace it with something 
else". They are alleged to have urged their followers not 
to respect the Indonesian flag or obey state laws and 
regulations. 
When the trial opened, none of the defendants had 
lawyers. This is a violation of the Criminal Procedures 
Law (K UHAP) which says that detainees must have legal 
assistance from the time of their arrest. 
According to the indictments, their fol lowers are said 
to consist primarily of pupils from lower and upper 
secondary schools, three of whom are also to be tried 
soon. 
The first hearing attracted so much attention that the 
authorities had to issue special cards for those allowed 
into the courtroom, and to place loudspeakers outside. 
Dozens of troops from the army and the pol ice were on 
guard round the lawcourt (Suara Merdeka, 23 December). 
Usroh t·rial opens in Uantul 
A member of usroh identified only as 'Sd bin R is on 
trial in the Bontul district court, accused of organising 
a lecture meeting or training session that was addressed 
by 'SC Cs' [the use of initials suggests that this person 
is also due to be tried]. The lecture was said to be 
aimed at recruiting four people to attend another usroh 
training course in Sawahan, Banaran, district of Kulon 
Progo, the place where Tubagus Moh. Jidan was active. 
Also, 'Bdm al Slh', a bicycle repair man, is being 
tried in Karanganyar on the usual charges. 
'SA Cs' advocated opposition to the Poncasila, to the 
family planning programme, to transmigration and to 
Pancasila indoctrination. Usroh, the indictment said, 
used the training session as a guise to encourage people 
to "wage war on" - memerangi - government officials as 
we] I as on other Muslims who accept the Pancasila. The 
training course held under the defendant's auspices was 
attended by twenty-nine people. During answers to 
questions at the session, the lecturer said that family 
planning is prohibited by Islam, a remark which, said the 
indictment, "clearly undermines the authority of the 
government which is currently promoting a family planning 
programme". 
New titles 
Tronsmigrasi: Myths and Realities, by Mariel 
Otten. 
IWGIA Document No. 57, 1986. 253 PP· 
Price: £3.50, UK and Europe. 
£5.00, airmail 
Indonesia: The Rise of Capital, by Richard 
Robison. 
Allen & Unwin, 1906, 425 pp. 
Available soon. 
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HUMAN RIGHTS 
Relatives of executed 
men speak out 
In September and October last year, nine longterm 
political prisoners convicted for alleged involvement in 
the e11ents of October 1965 were executed in Indonesia. We 
reproduce below extracts from a report in l'Humanite 
Dimanche by Dominique Bari entitled, "Underground in 
Indonesia: I met relatives of the executed men". 
"We are going through an endless nightmare. I can't find 
words to describe this constant persecution. Right up to 
the last moment, the army used the dirtiest of tricks to 
break us. They gave us hope then dashed it." 
These were the words of Mrs M. who agreed to meet the 
journalist. She described how on 16 September last year, 
a few days before the first of the nine political 
prisoners were executed, a senior army officer assembled 
the death-sentence prisoners and told them: "I have come 
to ask you for the addresses of your families. You will 
be released one day and we'd like to know what you intend 
to do, what job you will look for. If you have trouble 
finding accommodation, we want to help you for a time." 
"Just imagine how these men felt. Some had been in 
prison for about twenty years, most of that time waiting 
to be shot. Even if they doubted that the promise was 
serious, how could they not feel hopeful?' 
Dominique Bari writes that every time she managed to 
meet one of the relatives, there was a warm atmosphere, a 
long handshake, a friendly embrace, a shared emotion, but 
always the request not to mention names. 
Following that talk by the army officer, one of the 
prisoners, Colonel Sudyono, arrested in 1968 and 
sentenced in 1972, said he would try to get work as a 
translator. Another, Waluyo Subono later told his 
daughter that he had given the officer his address and 
said he would try to get a job so that she, his daughter, 
would not have to support him after his release. 
Playing with prisoners' emotions 
For the prisoners who had been waiting so long for the 
ever delayed day of execution, the prospect of death had 
suddenly been lifted, despite all their mistrust. 
"We began to hope even more than the prisoners," said 
Mrs M. "We were called to army headquarters. I was asked: 
'The situation may change after the spring elections 
[April 1987]. Will you be ready to welcome your husband 
home?' For a few hours I really believed that life would 
have some meaning again. But only for a few hours. The 
next day, I was again called to headquarters. On my way 
there, I was full of confidence. Then, showing no 
sensitivity, the officer told me: 'Your husband will be 
executed tomorrow.' I was speechless, terrorised. 'He has 
been transferred from Cipinang Prison to Cimanggis 
already.'" 
"I met my husband once more before he died," the woman 
went on. 'He told our children he would die without any 
sense of shame, with dignity. He regretted nothing. One 
con only say that it was not a broken man that the 
executioners killed a few hours later." 
The suffering continues 
For Mrs M. the suffering did not end with her husband's 
death. His murder has remained a secret. Her closest 
friends only notice that she has stopped rushing to the 
bus-stop every Saturday laden with parcels, on her way to 
Cipinang Prison. A silent solidarity has grown around 
her. But she does not dare to cry in public. She locks 
herself in, closes the shutters and suffers her grief all 
alone. 
All that the families got back from the authorities 
were the men's wedding rings and a few items of clothing. 
Even their writings were confiscated. Their bodies were 
not returned to the families. Mohammad Munir, a trade 
union leader, was executed a year ago in May 1985 but his 
wife still does not know where he is buried. 
Some families have been kept in total ignorance about 
execution decisions. Pudji Aswati, the wife of Gatot 
Lestario who was shot dead in July 1985, herself a 
prisoner serving on 18-year sentence in Malang Prison, 
was not told about the murder of her husband until 22 
days ofter his death. A letter she had sent him was 
returned with o note on the envelope from the prison 
authorities: Gatot is dead. 
As for Mrs Supono Marsudiyono, she arrived at Cipinang 
Prison on 4 October, carrying baskets of food; it was 
nine days after her husband's execution. Some prisoners 
may have been pardoned but no official list hos ever been 
published, and relatives know nothing, often because they 
live far away from the place of detention. 
The prisoners' families have lived lives of hell since 
1965, hunted down by the army and by the extreme right. 
They have hod to change their names, move home, conceal 
their identities. 
"We had no means of support," said Mrs S. "Our house 
had been looted, and anyway we couldn't stay in that part 
of town any more. Those who sympathised didn't dare help 
us." She sat with her grandson on her knee and her 
youngest son by her side. 
"I only ever met my father behind bars and I'm proud of 
it," said the son. His mother agreed, adding: "My husband 
was arrested in 1968 but I didn't hear anything for a 
year. He was in solitary confinement and was constantly 
moving. Much later, I heard that he had been dreadfully 
tortured. Munir's execution was a terrible shock for all 
of us. The Cipinang prisoners were shattered by the blow. 
Those who are left are just waiting for the worst to 
happen and are preparing themselves. They place their 
hopes in international protests. Only pressure from 
abroad can end the wave of executions." 
As she talked the child on her lap ran off laughing, 
unaware of the tragedy that engulfs his family. But he 
will soon know what life in Suharto's Indonesia holds for 
him, the grandson of a tapol, rejected by colleges and 
universities, by the public sector, the army, the private 
sector. He will hove to hide his origins from his closest 
friends, always fearing that his secret may be found out. 
Source: l"Humanite Dimanche, 14 November 1986 
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Suharto's Indonesia now seen as a 
''high risk'' 
It come as a profound shock to many in Jakarta when the 
London Economist, in its year-end analysis of the 
fortunes of countries of the Third World, placed 
Indonesia high in the category of 'high-risk' countries, 
three points behind South Africa and only six points 
behind Chile, El Salvador, Vietnam and Zaire. The shock 
was so great that the article became a major contributory 
factor to an end-of-year rush on the rupiah, forcing the 
foreign exchange market in Jakarta to close for a day. 
The main cause of the rush to buy dollars was a sudden 
panic over rumours that the Suharto government was about 
impose controls on foreign currency transactions or to 
devalue the rupiah for the second time in less than six 
months. According to one analyst, the fear originated 
amaig several foreign banks in Jakarta "who advised their 
big clients to shift to dollar positions" (Jakarta Post, 
3 January 1987). 
"Be an optimist, mote!" Tempo, 3 January 1987 
The panic occurred a few days after Minister of Finance 
Radius Prowiro announced that Indonesia's debt service 
ratio (the percentage of foreign exchange earnings used 
to pay interest aid repay foreign loans) had exceeded 30 
per cent and was fast approaching 40 per cent. 
The rush to buy dollars is aily the latest sign of a 
growing lack of confidence, at home and abroad, in the 
ability of the military regime to pull Indonesia out of 
the economic crisis that has gripped it for the past two 
years. The problems ore deep and far-reaching. The 45 per 
cent devaluation announced on 12 September 1986 has 
failed to boost non-petroleum exports, foreign investors 
are turning their backs on I ndonesio, foreign aid hos 
become the mainstay of state revenue and, worst of oil, 
moves to end monopolistic privileges enjoyed by close 
relatives and cronies of Suharto in the import business 
ore as remote as ever. 
The Economist's assessment 
In a league table of fifty countries published by The 
Economist, 20 December 1986, Indonesia did particularly 
badly under the heading, 'political affairs'. The 
countries were divided into 'hyper-risk' (four 
countries), 'very high-risk' (seven), 'high-risk' 
(seventeen) with Indonesia in fourth place, and the 
remaining twenty-two in 'medium-risk' and 'low risk' 
categories. 
Indonesia's highest score was under the heading 'war', 
obviously for its wars against East Timor and West Papua. 
It got its second worst scores for authoritarianism, 
illegitimacy of government and the 'staleness' of its 
style of government. The other high scores were for 
corruption and commodity dependence. 
No-one, not even the journal itself, claimed ' that the 
"Countries in Trouble" league table was scientifically 
valid. But it was intended to guide potential investors 
and lenders, which made it more worrying to businessmen 
in Jakarta than the most carefully constructed academic 
analysis. 
A budget to stifle wages and cut jobs 
The 1987 /88 budget announced by President Suharto on 6 
January has been designed to cut back the level of 
economic activity by dramatically curbing the level of 
government expenditure and investment. The inevitable 
result will be massive job losses and stagnation in pay 
levels at a time when the vast majority of workers with 
jobs receive little more than starvation wages. 
Symptomatic of this policy to force down living 
standards is the decision, for the second year running, 
not to raise wages for the more than three million people 
employed by the government. This could mean a fall of 
around 20 per cent in real wages since 1985. The wage 
freeze will not only affect the living standards of 
government employees, however. It will also squeeze 
aggregate demand and purchasing power, with devastating 
consequences for businesses and jobs in all sectors of 
the economy. 
Tempo (20 December 1986) emphasised that this 
"unpopular" policy is the result of pressure from the 
World Bonk, and acknowledges that it "will seriously 
affect efforts to create jobs and improve wage levels for 
the next year or two". The policy is being pursued 
despite the fact that about 1.8 million young people from 
school enter the labour force each year. It is the result 
of Suharto's refusal to consider deficit financing as a 
way to stimulate economic activity, also an essential 
element in the World Bank's austerity doctrine for Third 
World countries. 
Not surprisingly, with no independent trade unions left 
to represent the interests of Indonesian workers, there 
have been no criticisms of this severe attack on living 
standards, though businessmen have been quick to condemn 
the budget because it is bound to result in retrenchment, 
shut-downs and bankruptcies. The attack on Ii ving 
standards is the price Suharto is willing to pay to 
safeguard Indonesia's obligations to foreign creditors. 
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Revenue and foreign aid 
Although Indonesia's foreign debt now exceeds $40 
billion, this latest budget gets Indonesia deeper into 
debt by making state revenue more than ever dependent on 
foreign aid. Project aid from members of the lnter-
Governmentol Group on Indonesia is budgetted to go up by 
55 per cent as compared with 1986/87, from Rp. 3.5 
trillion to Rp 5.43 trillion, and will now account for 
about 25 per cent of state revenue. 
The For Eastern Economic Review (15 January 1987) 
coiled the budget "on unmitigated portrayal of the depth 
of trouble the economy hos reached''. The trouble stems 
from Indonesia's heavy reliance on petroleum for the past 
two decodes and the huge influx of foreign aid. Just as 
repayment of loons and interest was beginning to peak, 
the bottom fel I out of the world petroleum market, 
plunging the economy into a crisis of grave proportions. 
Another factor aggravating the crisis is that around 50 
per cent of Indonesia's foreign debt must be repaid in 
foreign currencies other than the dollar - the yen, the 
German mark, sterling, the Dutch gui Ider and so on - all 
of which have appreciated in value against the dollar, 
whereas the country's earnings from exports is received 
almost entirely in dollars. 
Indonesia's • growing 
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per cent, will be spent to service Indonesia's foreign 
debt. The budget figures also reveal that the funds 
needed to service the foreign debt each year (Rp 6.8 
trillion) now exceed the funds received in new aid (Rp 
5.43 tri 11 ion), even though aid allocations are rising. 
Thus Indonesia now pays bock more to its foreign 
creditors than it receives annually in new credit. 
At the some time, government investment wil 1 fal 1 by 
6.5 percent, from Rp. 8.3 trillion to Rp. 7.8 trillion. 
But the impact on job-creation is far worse than the 6.5 
per cent contraction implied because more than half - Rp 
4.4 trillion - will be spent in western countries that 
supply the foreign aid (Jakarta Post, 8 J onuary 1987). 
[See separate item on Indonesian-UK relations.] 
In his budget speech, President Suharto expressed the 
hope that private capitol would be able to fill the gap 
caused by foll ing government investment but the business 
world Is pessimistic. Private companies hove stil I not 
dbsorbed the full impact of the September devaluation in 
terms of rising costs and falling demand. How then con 
they be expected to expand investments or buy up ailing 
state companies? 
Almost without exception, commentators express the view 
that the only way the disastrous impact of the budget on 
debt • service ratio 
1982 
1983 
1983 
1984 
1984 
1985 
1985 
1986 
1986 
1987 
18,6 19,8 20,3 18,2 13 
2,6 
As a result of the foreign exchange cras1s, revenues 
from the non-oil sector ore budgetted for the first time 
in many years to exceed revenues from the oi I companies 
which ore expected to foll by 28.7 per cent. The budget 
is based on the assumption that the price of oil will 
average $15 a barrel for the year. 
To compensate for the foll in oil revenues, revenues 
from income tax aid VAT are budgetted to rise by 15 per 
cent and 65.4 per cent respectively. Most analysts doubt 
whether this is realistic because of foiling purchasing 
power and business activity. It is widely expected that 
economic performance in 1987 will be even worse than in 
1986 when Gross Domestic Product fell by · 1 per cent. 
Expenditure 
The budget envisages a steep foll in the level of 
government expenditure within Indonesia. The expenditure 
side of the budget is divided into two sections: routine 
expenditures and 'development' expenditures or government 
investment. While routine expenditure will rise 14.5 per 
cent compared with 1986/87, from Rp. 13. 1 trill ion to R p. 
15 trillion, no less than Rp 6.8 trillion of this, or 45 
2,9 3,8 4,7 5,8 
the economy can be lessened is by overol l deregulation of 
economic institutions, in particular, by ending the 
hugely profitable import monopolies that hove been 
granted to members of the Suharto family in the post few 
years. In Indonesia the subject is taboo but just six 
weeks before the new budget was announced, the Asim Woll 
Street Journal dropped a bombshell by publishing three 
articles unravelling the get-rich-quick ventures of 
Suharto's sons and their friends. [See separate item.] 
ORDER YOUR COPY NOW 
The Ecologist 
BANKINC ON DISASTER 
Indonesia·• Transmigration Programme 
SURVIVAL INTERNATIONAL 
F~ THE at0Hf$ OF HtllUJENEO TlllllAL ~OPlH . ....... ( ~-- ........ Do•-· p , •• ~.- ..... "'·-~ - - ~-4~ •• ·- ....... ,.~ •• 
Avoi loble from T APOL. Price, £2.00 Including dispatch, or 
£3.00 Including dispatch by oir. 
TAPOL Bullet!n No. 79, February 1987 7 
More Rapiers for Indonesia 
British Aerospace hos won its third contract in two years 
for the sale to Indonesia of Rapier ground-to-air 
missiles. The rew deal, announced in December, is worth 
£40 million and brings the total value of Rapiers being 
supplied to the Indonesian armed forces to £160 million. 
Altogether, British Aerospace has won contracts worth 
£340 mi 11 ion from Indonesia for Rapiers and for the 
twenty ground-attack Hawk aircraft supplied since the 
late 1970s. 
The latest Rapier deal incorporates 'offset' benefits, 
allocating port of the manufacturing of the missiles to 
Indonesia's state aerospace industry, the IPTN, and to 
another state company, Radio Frequency Comm1X1ication. The 
deal includes training facilities for IPTN employees in 
the UK and other forms of technology transfer. 
The Rapiers are being purchased to defend the capital, 
the oil installations in East Kalimantan and the huge 
IPTN complex in Bandung (Tempo, 20 December 1966). 
Meanwhile, Britain delivered a survey vessel for the 
Indonesia Navy in December. The vessel con be equipped 
with weapons, as similar vessels in service with the 
Royal Novy were equipped during the Falklands War 
( Kompos, 3 December 1966). 
Scorpion tonk deal still under consideration 
Reports lost year that negotiations were under way for 
Indonesia to purchase six hundred Scorpion tonks made by 
Alvis in Coventry have surfaced again in Jane's Defence 
Weekly (20 December 1966). The journal quotes on official 
of United Scientific Holdings, which owns Alvis, as 
saying that Indonesia is still interested in buying the 
vehicle though the fall in the price of oil will reduce 
the size of the order. An Indonesian delegation is 
expected to visit Alvis early in 1967 for further talks. 
Other UK arms manufacturers looking for more orders 
from Indonesia ore Marconi and Plessey who hope to sell 
Indonesia a radar system for its eastern region. A French 
compmy, Thompson CFS, hos won on order for a similar 
system for western Indonesia (Finmcial Times, 3 December 
1966). 
Indonesian officers visit the UK 
There has been a steady stream of visits to the UK by 
officers of the Indonesian armed forces. In a written 
answer to Terry Davis, MP, the Foreign Office gave the 
following information about visits since 1965: 
* April, 1985: Admiral Romly, Chief-of-Naval Stoff, to 
attend the commissioning of a Royal Navy frigate sold to 
Indonesia. 
* Moy, 1985: General Supordi, secretory-general of the 
Deportment of Defence for discussions about defence 
equipment. 
* July, 1985: General Surono, Minister for Political and 
Social Affairs, and B.J. Hobibie, president-director of 
IPTN, for talks on industrial co-operation. 
.. .. .. 
A Rapier was on show at the Jakarta Air Show, 1986. 
Tempo, 20 December 1986. 
Air Chief Marshall Sukardi, Chief of Air Stoff, to 
visit UK defence manufacturers. 
* October, 1985: Rear Admiral Kosendo, to attend the 
commissioning of a Royal Novy frigate for Indonesia. 
* June, 1986: A party of high-ranking officers to visit 
the British Army Equipment Exhibition. 
* July, 1986: Rear Admiral Bosoeki, Deputy Chief of Naval 
Stoff (Logistics), for talks relating to Indonesia's 
purchase of more Royal Novy frigates. 
* September, 1986: a party of high-ranking officers to 
attend the Farnborough Air Show. 
Air Vice-Marshall Hartono, Director of Air Defence 
headquarters, to visit the RAF base at Lossiemouth. 
* October, 1986 Lieutenant-General Sonoesi, Head of the 
Police Force, to visit New Scotland Yard and to look at 
police training facilities. 
Source: Hansard, 12 December 1966. 
Economic ties ore strengthening 
Two trade missions from the UK hove visited Indonesia in 
the post few months, one from the London Chamber of 
Commerce and one from the Glosg:>w Chamber of Commerce. 
The visits ore the first since 1983 and show that British 
companies are hoping to make new progress in their 
involvement with project construction in Indonesia. 
Shortly before these two missions, UK Minister of 
Agriculture, Michael Jopling was also in Jakarta, leading 
a nine-person delegation to talk about buying more 
agricultural products from Indonesia so as to improve 
two-way trade. At present, there is a large surplus in 
Britain's favour. In 1985, Indonesian exports to the UK 
amounted to $191.4 million as against imports valued at 
$300.4 mi 11 ion. 
British Energy Minister, Peter Walker is also due to 
visit Indonesia in Morch. 
... el. r &n' t E ! 
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The 'soft loon' bonanza 
New prospects have opened up for British businesses 
following the decision by the British Government, 
announced in July last year, to grant £140 million in 
'soft' loans to finance the UK costs of mutually-agreed 
development projects in Indonesia. The ogreement made 
Indonesia the second biggest recipient of UK soft loans 
after China and marked a commitment by the UK to win 
contracts in Indonesia with the help of concessionary 
fnancing (Financial Times, 19 June 1986). 
As a more recent issue of the Financial Times ( 1 2 
December 1986) reported, "Indonesia ... has rapidly 
become a key market for large orders of capital equipment 
and big construction work since the downturn of project 
activity in the Middle East and the Gulf'. Already the 
British Export Credit Guarantee Department has given the 
go-ahead for eight large projects in Indonesia involving 
Sri tish companies. 
UK-INDONESIAN RELATIONS 
------
This explains the composition of the London Chamber of 
Commerce mission, consisting of representatives of 
Lloyds, Barclays and K leinwort Benson whose banking 
foci Ii ties wi II support the projects, and Bal four Beatty 
Construction, General Electric, Massey-Ferguson and 
others who will be directly involved in the projects. 
While these projects will help boost British exports 
and sustain the level of 'development' projects in 
Indonesia at a time of huge budget cuts, the trend is not 
welcome to Indonesian contractors. The businessmen's 
organisation, Kodin, has already · complained that on 
increase in the role of foreign contractors wil I give 
foreign creditors "a large influence in determining the 
suppliers of goods and services for the development 
projects they hove financed" {Jakarta Post, 23 December 
1986). 
ECONOMICS 
The Suharto family fortunes 
In a feature story published in tJ1e 1lsian Wall Street Jouu1al on 24, 2 5 and 26 fl 011e m ber 1986, Steven Jones and Raphael 
Pura made a detailed investigation of the recent business ventures of members of the Suharto family, in particular, the 
lucrative monopoly interests cornered by the President's sons. A long extract of the articles also appeared in the Wall 
Street Journal on 24 November. 
Although the three issues of the Asian Wall Street 
Journal were immediately banned, news of their contents 
spread fast, and the photocopy machines were soon hard at 
work. Five weeks earlier, the leading Jakarta evening 
paper, Sinor Harapan, had been closed down indefinitely 
for reporting on the same topic though with far greater 
circumspection than the AWSJ. By merely reporting that 
forty-four monopolies might be abolished, mentioning no 
names, the daily sent Suharto into a rage and had to pay 
the price. But the Jakarta business world knew precisely 
what lay behind the Sinor report. As a western diplomat 
said: "They (Sinor) put the problem right in the 
president's living room" {AWSJ, 24 November). 
The AWSJ articles are far more topical than the article 
by David Jendns, ptblished in the Sydney Morning Herald 
on 10 April 1986, which dwelt on the Suharto family's 
past acquisitions. But who can explain why the Jenkins 
piece aroused such public fury, with repercussions on 
relations with Australia lasting for many months, while 
the AWSJ onslaught was hushed up and hod no repercussions 
for Indonesia-US relations? Perhaps this was because Woll 
Street hod a hand in this latest exposure and Suharto hod 
to think twice before taking on such a formidable critic. 
A stake in almost every important commodity 
Suharto's closest relatives have now emerged as 
Indonesia's richest businessmen. As AWSJ puts it: 
"In recent years the Suharto sons have put together a 
maze of businesses giving them a stake in almost every 
important commodity or service in the country. In most 
cases, these businesses originate from and thrive on 
state contracts, government decrees or licences giving 
concerns tied to the Suharto sons and their associates 
special rights to handle the import, manufacture or 
distribution of such goads or services." 
According to the paper, the Suharto sons benefit from 
the fol lowing arrangements: 
- The assignment of import licences, often to a single 
company. 
- The use of quotas to control imports, with quotas 
frequently divided among a few designated importers. 
- The designation of 'approved traders' 1 im iting the 
number of companies that may distribute a product 
domestically. 
- Investment licensing to protect existing companies from 
new competition. 
- The designation of local joint venture partners for 
major foreign investment projects, especially in public 
works. 
- The granting of semi-exclusive rights for service 
contracts such as insurance { AWSJ, 24 November). 
The three Suharto sons at the centre of the A WSJ 
investigation ore S igi t Har joyudanto, 35, Bambang 
Trihatmocljo, 33 cn:I Huromo Mcn:bla Putera known as Tommy, 
24. By combining parts of their names, the trio are 
referred to these days in Jakarta as 'Tosiba', after the 
giant Japanese electronics corporation, Toshiba. 
Suharto's daughter, Siti Hardyanti known as Tutut and her 
husband, Indra Kowora are also port of the story. 
The following is a brief summary of the dazzling array 
of Suharto family companies and monopal ies unravelled by 
the AWSJ. 
Bambang Trihatmodjo 
Suharto's second eldest son, the most visible of the 
three, has built his empire around: 
P.T. Bimantara Citro, registered in May 1982. The 
company consists of some fifty daughter companies with 
interests ranging from baby food, cardboard box and 
plastics manufactures to liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
tankers and oi 1 trading. The major share-holders are 
Bombang and his brother-in-law, Indra Kowara. 
Ponca Holding Ltd which has been designated as sole 
agent for P.T. Mega Eltra, the state-owned trading 
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company that holds import monopolies for plastics. 
Virtually all imports of essential plastics like 
polypropylene and PVC must go through Ponca Holding. The 
company was incorporated in Vanuatu and registered in 
Hongkong in March 1985. The three company directors ore 
Barrbang, Sigit and Sudwikatmaio. Sudwikatmaio is a cousin 
and foster brother of Suharto and grew up together with 
him. 
Bambang Trihatmodjo 
The 25 November issue of A WS J deals extensively with 
this plastics monopoly and the damaging effects on the 
Indonesian economy. Several plastics manufacturers 
interviewed said that the Ponca Holding monopoly hos 
raised import costs by 20 to 25 per cent. Commissions and 
other fees paid to the company alone odd 15 to 20 per 
cent to the cost of plastic row materials in Indonesia. 
A WSJ estimates that Ponca Holding earns around $30 
million simply by "shuffling paper" (AWSJ, 25 November). 
P.T. Polychem Undq part of the Bimantara Group, is 
now the country's sole manufacturer of polystyrene. 
Although it has not the capacity to serve the huge 
domestic market, it hos held on to its monopoly position, 
pushing domestic prices 10 to 15 per cent above imports. 
P. T. Somudra Petrindo and Permindo Oil Troding Co. The 
former, set up in 1981, is jointly owned by Bambang and 
Indra Kowara, while Bambang, according to corporate 
records is the company's executive director. The 
Hongkong-based Permindo is 65 per cent owned by M indo 
Petroleum Co. whose three largest shareholders ore 
Barrbang, Indra Kowara C11d Sudwikatm010 who, together with 
A.R. Romly, president-director of the state oil company, 
Pert om ino, ore the four di rectors of Perm indo. 
The two companies whose operations ore described in 
AWSJ of 26 November have been given the right by 
Pertomino to market more than half a million barrels of 
oil a month and in return, supply the oil company with 
refined oil products from Singapore. 
Samudra Petrindo or Som Pet as it is called by oil 
traders, has ployed ·a signCficont role in Indonesia's oil 
trade since the early 1980s. Oil company executives 
familiar with the oil market soy that Som Pet and 
Permindo trade more than $500 million a year in crude and 
distillate products, with profits running into tens of 
millions a year. Som Pet also handles oil shipments of 
Indonesia's LNG exports to South Korea under a 20-yeor 
contract. The two tmkers that run the troject ore portly 
owned by Som Pet. 
Bombong's Bimontoro Citro is a shore-holder in P.T. 
Food Specialties Indonesiq o unit of Nestle S.A. which 
produces milk powder, while P.T. Bumi Sumber Sari Sokti, 
part of the Bimontara group, owns 60 per cent of P.T. 
Gulo Putih Motorom, a Sumatra-based sugar-cone plantation 
and sugar refinery. Bombong is the executive-director of 
this corporation. 
Hutomo Mandala Putera 
The youngest of Suharto's sons was
1 
born ~4 years o~o 
when as Major-General Suharto, todays President was in char~e of the Mandala Command, the operation to 
'liberate' West Papua from Dutch colonialism. 'Tommy' is 
the latest to emerge on the corporate scene, but his 
business interests are fast catching up with his older 
brothers. Tommy is well-known in Jakarta's jet set as a 
car and boot racing enthusiast. 
His flag company is P.T. Humpuss, established in 1984, 
in which he is the executive director, with older brother 
Sigit as one of the major shore-holders. Humpuss holds 
licences as sole local distributor for several vital 
petrochemical products produced by Pertamina, including 
purified terephtalic acid, an essential ingredient in the 
manufacture of synthetic fibre, and methanol, the major 
alcohol used in industry. 
Humpuss also has interests in oil services and hos 
plans to move into LNG shipping as well as become a 
defence contractor. Along with other members of the 
'Cendana group', named after the street where Suharto's 
family home is located, he is a member of P. T. Gula Putih 
Mataram's supervisory board. 
Hutomo 
Mandala Pulera 
S igi t Har joyudanto 
Suharto's eldest son is the one chosen to keep the 
family tradition high. He has been engaged in business 
for a number of years already and most of his corporate 
alliances are with his father's long-time allies, in 
particular Liem Sioe Uong and Bob Hasson, the two 
Chinese entrepreneurs who have taken care of Suharto's 
finances since the early 1950s when he was a colonel and 
commander of the Diponegoro Division in Central Java. 
While father was busy handling state affairs, Sigit 
took over the family's collaboration with these loyal 
business associates. In the late 1970s, Sigit bought up 
Gunung Solak, a mountain in West Java, transforming it 
into a huge cattle ranch, which also produces a wide 
variety of vegetables and other crops. The T opos ranch 
has become Suharto's favourite leisure retreat, the place 
where he likes to portray himself as a dedicated former. 
Bank Central Asia is ln,donesia's largest private bank 
owned by Liem Sioe Uong. Sigit and his sister Siti 
Hardiyanti are listed as share-holders and directors. 
P.T. Nusontaro Ampera Bakti or 'Nusambo' is an 
investment rolding company owned jointly by Sigit and Bob 
Hasson. Formed in 1982, Nusamba has investments in tea 
plmtations and timber concessions and is the sole agent 
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Sigit Harjojudanto 
for Nissan cars. It is also a joint holder, with state 
companies, of domestic monopolies covering tin-plate and 
oil sector insurance. Nusamba has a 24 per cent share in 
P.T. Pelot Timah Nusantara and a 35 per cent share in 
P.T. Tugu Pratama Indonesia. 
P.T. Pelot Timm l'llsmtara Indonesia or 'Latinusa' have 
a monopoly over tinplate, essential for the canning of 
foodstuffs. According to the A WSJ, manufacturers of goods 
that use tin in packaging claim that a domestically made 
ccn:i cos~s 60 to 70 per cent more than an imported one, a 
pnce difference that has caused many domestic food and 
native beverage manufacturers to go bankrupt. 
P.T. TLJ9':' Pratama lndonesiq an insurance company, has 
grown rapidly to become one of Indonesia's largest 
insurance concerns s i nee it was op pointed in 1981 as the 
sole insurer of Pertamina and the 35 foreign oil 
companies operating in Indonesia. Tugu Pratama's profits 
for the year ending 31 March 1985 were recorded at Rp. 
18.7 bi 11 ion or something I ike $20 mi 11 ion. It is at 
present receiving on annual premium of about $21 million 
from Goruda, the national airline company. 
P.T. Sinor Mas Inti Perkasa is 55 per cent owned by 
Sigit and Liem Sioe Uong. This is the country's largest 
privately-owned palm-oil conglomerate and owns palm-oil 
plantations, processing plants and a soles network for 
cooking oil. Sigit is deputy president of the company's 
supervisory board. 
P. T. Rejo Sari Bumi portiall y owns P. T. Gunung Madu 
plantations, an integrated sugar estate and refinery in 
Sumatra. Rejo Sari Bumi is controlled by Probosutejo, 
Suharto's half brother, while Sigit is a major share-
holder and executive director of the company and director 
of Gunung Madu. 
Mention has already been made of Sigit's stakes in P.T. 
Humpuss, P.T. Gula Putih Mataram and the plastics 
monopoly, Ponca Holding. 
Siti Hardyanti and Indra Kowara 
The business interests of this couple are primarily in 
the Birnantara Gr~, Sam Pet and Permindo. Siti Hardyaiti 
is listed as a share-holder and director of the Bank 
Central Asia, while both are deeply involved in agro-
businesses such as Gunung Madu Plantations, Gula Putih 
Motaram and P. T. Pipit lndah, a company that partly owns 
Gunung Madu. 
But this couple have been the focus of attention 
recently for a different reason, following the murder 
last year of society model, Dietje Budimulyono who was 
found shot dead in her car. Dietje was known in Jakarta 
society as a high-class coll-girl who, according to 
persistent rumours, hod a secret liaison with Indra 
Kowara. When his wife, Tutut, got wind of the affair, she 
-------
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is said to have hired someone to murder Dietje. For 
months, the police got nowhere with their enquiries, 
strengthening the suspicion that there was a cover-up. In 
January the pol ice announced the arrest of a suspect, an 
elderly faith-healer named Pakde who, according to the 
pol ice, murdered D ietje after failing to return money 
given to him on a promise that he could multiply its 
value. The rumours of a cover-up rumble on however I I 
though the names of Indra Kowara and his wife are never 
mentioned in public. Leading lawyers of the Legal Aid 
Institute (LBH) have taken on Pakde's defence. 
The older generation 
Sudwikatmono 
The A WSJ investigation draws attention to the rising 
fortunes of the second generation Suharto family clique, 
but what of the first generation, until recently the ones 
who were under the spotlight? The riches of Probosutedjo 
Suharto's half-brother are far less dazzling these day~ 
possibly because he came into conflict with Suharto's 
closest business oily, Liem Sioe Liong. 
Cousin Sudwikatmono, on the other hand, is sti II on the 
rise. His alliances with Bambang and Sigit are bringing 
him new riches, while his earlier ventures with Liem 
cover wide-ranging business activities: The Sinor Mas 
Group already mentioned, tre lndo-Cement Tunmal Prakcrsa 
which produces half of Indonesia's cement, Bogasari which 
holds the monopoly for wheat flour, and P.T. Giwang 
Selogram which holds the monopoly for the import of cold-
rolled sheet steel, a basic ingredient for steel products 
ranging from car bodies to galvanised roofing and tin-
cans. Sudwikatmono holds directorships in the latter 
three companies. All these Liem companies rest on solid 
financial and political foundations. 
The AWSJ investigation sheds light on the central 
configuration of the Indonesian business world today. The 
major strategic industries I ike oil and gas, plantations 
and communications are in state hands, run by state 
companies with Suharto loyalists in control. Alongside 
this state sector and fed by it are private companies, 
the most powerful and profitable of which are largely 
controlled by merrhers of the Suharto clan or the family's 
close associates. This burgeoning family business empire 
positively puts the Morcos empire into the shade. 
The complete set of A WSJ articles is available from TA POL 
fox £1.00 including postage, ox £1.50 aixmail. 
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1 EASTT/MOR 
Population control enters 
anew phase 
At the end of 1986 the Indonesian administration in East 
Timor af'll"K>unced ti-at pemuk.iman k.embali or re-resettlement 
of the population, would be given top priority in 
1987/88. Bosoeki Adisoekmo, head of the Transmigration 
Department's regional office in East Timor, said the 
programme would involve both re-resettlement of the East 
Timorese and transmigration of people into East Timor 
from elsewhere. In other words, there ore two population 
policy objectives, the standard Indonesian transmigration 
programme and the relocation of the East Timorese who 
since 1979 have been subject to several resettlements. 
As a study of Indonesia's population policy will show, 
the progress of the programme is linked to the renewed 
military offensive code-named Operasi K il<is or Operation 
Extinction, which was launched lost July. 
Populot ion control in 1979-1982 
Since 1979, there hove been three phases in Indonesia's 
population control programme in East Timor, 1979-1982, 
1982-1986 and the period which is just beginning. 
The first phase began after the army's extermination 
and annihilation campaign which lasted from September 
1977 till March 1979. During this period, the vast 
majority of East Timorese were outside Indonesian 
control. They were 1 iving in the mountainous interior; 
many had always lived there while others had fled inland 
in advance of army operations to gain control of the 
lowland, coastal areas. 
lndones io launched a savage campaign of aerial 
bombardment against the population together with troop 
movements to encircle Fretilin positions. The aim was to 
destroy the Fretilin leadership and its guerrilla forces 
and force the population into the lowland areas which 
were under Indonesian control. The campaign devastated 
vast areas, k i I led tens of thousands of people and 
destroyed the agricultural system, causing widespread 
food shortages. 1978 and 1979 were years of acute famine 
and disease. 
After the final Indonesian push from March-July 1979, 
the distraught East Timorese were herded into daerah 
pemul<i man or resettlement areas. It is generally accepted 
that by the end of 1979, about 200,000 hod been killed or 
had died from famine and disease. It was not ti II October 
1979, when Indonesia finally allowed international relief 
operations to begin, that the appallingly high death toll 
began to foll. 
In December 1979, US ombasscxlor Edward Masters gave on 
aerial map to a congressional hearing, identifying 145 
resettlement ore.as. There were probably more than that as 
a Fretilin report in 1983 spoke of more camps in certain 
areas than appeared on the ambassador's mop. 
The resettlement camps set up during this first phase 
of population control had several characteristics: 
- people hod been herded into hos ti ly created sites with 
on overage population of 2,000 each; 
- the locations had been chosen at random, mostly in 
places where food production was hardly possible or had 
ceased altoget,her because of the Indonesian bombing; a 
East Timo£ese women captives gather to 'welcome' General 
Umor Wirohodikusumoh, the Vice-President, on a visit to 
Atouro prison island. Jakarta Post, 9 August 1986. 
Fretilin report in 1983 described many comps as being in 
barren regions, totally unsuitable for food-growing; 
- the primary security objectives of the resettlement 
policy were to separate the population from the guerrilla 
movement and to establish army control over the people. 
In 1982 the Australian journalist, David Jenkins 
confirmed that many comps were unproductive, located 
where the soil "is often white with sol t". But he hod 
been told that the Indonesians were making plans to 
'regroup' some communities bock to the highlands "in the 
interests of higher production", though the traditional 
disper5ol of Timorese hamlets would not be allowed (Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 6 August 1982). 
The comps created in this first period foiled to serve 
Indonesian m ii itory strategy for several reasons: 
Hoving been set up in haphazard fashion, the comps were 
difficult to guard and patrol, mok ing them vulnerable to 
guerrilla attacks. 
Conditions in the comps were so deplorable that the 
army's 'hearts and minds' policy hod no chance of 
success. [Army strategists cling to the belief that 
better economic conditions will make people forget their 
right to self-determination.] Comp-dwellers hod to walk 
miles to reach land that could be tilled and, when they 
went to t ii l land, they were under constant army guard. 
Under o new leadership, the Fretilin hod recovered from 
the heavy losses of 1978-79 and hod succeeded in building 
o network of contacts with the comps. 
The resistance movement hod the run of the more fertile 
areas abandoned by the people. Moreover, many people in 
the resettlements fled to join the guerrillas. 
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Population control from 1982 to 1986 
The military were COfl'l>elled to rethink their settlement 
policy and decided to create new settlements that were 
more amenchle to their security needs. Camp populations 
were uprooted again and forced to settle in new locations 
situated along asphalt roads built by the army, making it 
easier to prevent contact with the guerrillas. 
Whereas camps in the initial phase had included people 
from different regions, the military now considered this 
to be a mistake and concluded that security would be 
better served by grouping people from the same area 
together. Some concessions were made to camp dwellers so 
that they could grow food in small vegetable plots near 
their homes. But tilling the soil for staple crops still 
involved long treks, under guard, and these trips were 
often forbidden because of security operations. 
'Model villages' and 'development villages' 
At the same time, Jakarta poured in investment funds to 
try out two new forms of population control, the desa 
teladan or'model vi llage1 and the desa pe m bangunan or 
'development village'. The former is typical of 
settlements in a colonial, plantation economy. Some of 
the people in 'model villages' are transmigrants 
(Indonesians from outside) and some are East T imorese. 
'Model villages' were the first attempt to create 
transmigration sites in East Timor, and ore required to 
focus on the production of cash crops. 
Plans have been announced to open up large areas for 
cash crop production. According to Oscar Victor, head of 
the East Timor Plantations Office, during the current 
five-year plan (1984/89), the plantation area of East 
Timor is scheduled to expand by 2.72 per cent annually, 
rising from 144,693 hectares in 1984 to 156,637 hectares 
in 1989. The planned acreage and output ore as follows: 
Coffee 48,648 ha 11, 115.6 tons 
Coconut 49,000 ho 10,290 tons 
Areca nut 35,981 ha 3.418 tons 
Kapok 9,950 ho 1,243.7 tons 
Macadamia nuts 4,450 ha 890 tons 
Cinnamon bark 2,916 ho 334 tons 
Cloves 1,895 ha 1.5 tons 
Tobacco 1,750 ha 1,093.7 tons 
Cashew nuts 1,000 ha 14,5 tons 
Rubber 832 ha 78,5 tons 
Vanil lo 80 ha 1.2 tons 
Tea 70 ha 4.5 tons 
Pepper 65 ha 0.4 tons 
Source: Pedomon Rakyat, 24 October 1986 
Plans 1 ike these can be expected to assume greater 
importance with the collapse of oil prices and 
Indonesia's desparote need to increase non-oil exports. 
An example of a 'model village' is Salele, in the sub-
district of Tilomar, 47 km from Suoi, the capitol of 
Kovalima district. It was set ~ in October 1985 with 500 
'model' farmers, half of them East Timorese and hol f from 
East Java, Central Java, Jogjakarta and Bali. As with 
transmigration sites elsewhere, each family gets 0.25 
hectares for a house and garden plus one hectare for 
crops. Salele's transmigrants are required to produce 
coconuts for exports. As this is a show-case village, the 
villagers have been well provided for. They have been 
given thousands of coconut plants as well as 95 cows and 
a promise of 250 more. Recently, Carrascalao promised to 
help the village set up its own village cooperative and 
to give it a brand-new van to carry their produce to 
market ( Pedoman Rakyat, 1 December 1986). 
Carrascaloo said that the 'model vi lloge' concept means 
shifting people from high-density to low-density areas, 
but denied it would mean transferring poverty from one 
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place to another, or sending people to remote areas. It 
would improve living standards and open up new prospects. 
What he foiled to say was that, before Indonesia began 
its violently enforced programme of population control, 
East Timorese lived in dispersed hamlets in the interior, 
where the density of population had always been low. It 
was the resettlement of the late 1970s that herded them 
together, creot i ng heav i 1 y populated areas that never 
existed before the I ndonesiam came. 
Since 1982, 825 families have been tronsm igrated, among 
them 399 families from outside and 426 East Timorese 
families, the so-called 'translocals'. The main districts 
chosen for the transmigration sites are Bobonoro and 
Kovalima, both near the border with West Timor ( Kompas, 
24 December 1986). Another site has been created in the 
east, near Viqueque, which accommodates one hundred 
tronsmigrant families from the East Java Christion Church 
in Jember. (Mutiara, 30 July-12 August 1986). Initially 
it was said that 100 'model villages' would be created in 
1986 and 126 in 1987 but these targets are far behind 
Some of the tens of thousands of East Timorese orphans 
doing chores at an orphanage. Tempo, 19 July 1986. 
schedule, partly for lack of funds but also because much 
of East Timor is still not under Indonesian control. 
The other type of village that began to emerge in 1986 
was the 'development vi I loge', a concept promoted by 
Colonel Yunus Yosfiah, a para-command:> and commander of 
the East Timor Wirodharma Military Command. Last July, 
Colonel Yosfiah said the best way to cope with the armed 
resistance was to improve living standards. His troops 
had set up 500 'model gardens' run by babinsa officers in 
the villages, the non-commissioned officers at the lowest 
end of the army command structure. The gardens vary in 
size from 250 square metres to one hectare. If each 
garden could provide for ten families, the population of 
East Timor would, according to Yosfiah, be self-
supporting in three or four years. In addition, sub-
district military commands had been instructed to hove 
fish-ponds built (Tempo, 19 July 1986). 
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Yosfiah's programme mecnt that army officers were now 
under instructions to control the agricultural pursuits 
of people in the daera.h pem uki man. The army was also 
admitting that food production was still hopelessly 
inadequate and drastic measures were needed, but only 
under the direct command of the troops. 
Operasi kikis and the final stage of population control 
It is highly significant that the announcement of o new 
resettlerrent programme to be launched in East Timor in 
1987 /88 was mode by an official of the Deportment of 
T ransm igrat ion. Basoek i Adi soekma, head of the 
Deportment's regional office, said the programme could 
commence because the infra-structure was now ready and 
"security has now been restored". He said the East 
Timorese would be allowed to return to their native 
regions but his reference to infra-structure meant they 
would be located in specially-built sites and would not 
return to their original hamlets. In the first site to be 
set up, in the district of Baucau, 300 families would be 
re-resettled (Kompas, 24 December 1986). 
Governor Corrascalao gave backing to the programme, 
adding significantly that "once the East Timorese have 
been placed in decent locations, there will be no more 
problems and obstacles to transmigration horn outside 
East Timor" (Kompos, 24 December 1986). 
What conclusions con be drawn from the plans to begin a 
major transmigration programme in East Timor? 
First of all it suggests that 0 perasi K. ikis which was 
launched by the army lost July, was aimed primarily at 
driving Fretilin guerrilla forces. back so as to gain more 
territory where transmigration sites can be established. 
In 1 ine with the army's hanka mrata or 'total people's 
defence' doctrine, these settlements ore integral to army 
strategy, con sol idat ing its control over areas against 
guerrilla operations, and to the army's concept of 
"territorial management and territorial warfare". As 
Non-combat tant East 
Timorese now living in 
Fretilin-held areas of the 
country. 
From o set of photographs 
received from Fretilin in 
1986. 
General Benny Murdani, comme11der of the armed forces, 
once said, "transmigration is the only programme in the 
economic field that must quite categorically be tied in 
with defence and security considerations" (Sinor Harapan, 
8 March 1985). 
Secondly, in East Timor, unlike other areas designated 
for transmigration, large-scale importation of peasant 
labour can only proceed after the re-resettlement of the 
native population has been carried out. The reason is 
that in the daerah pemukiman, the inhabitants "are not 
given any guarantee of land tenure", according to 
Basoeki. ln other words, they possess nothing. What 
Basoeki did not say was that they were robbed of the I and 
they owned and lived from before the Indonesian invasion. 
In the transmigration sites, they will receive the 
standard plot of land, apparently as compensation for all 
that has happened since 1979. [Whether this will persuade 
them to accept integration is another matter.) 
Following this, the new sites organised by Basoeki's 
office will receive their share of Balinese or Javanese 
pease11ts. Instead of daerah pemukiman, East Timor will 
then consist of normal transmigration sites. No figures 
hove been given for the number of transm igrants but 
Carrascalao is quoted as saying that by the year 2000, 
the population of East Timor may reach one million 
(Mutiara, 30 July-12 August 1986). 
The composition of the population of Salele indicates 
that the ratio between Timorese and transmigronts hos 
been fixed at 1: 1, a far higher proportion of 
'tronslocals' than elsewhere. This is because such a high 
percentage of T imorese have already been uprooted and 
have to be put somewhere. 
The third point is that with transmigration now so 
closely integrated with population control of the East 
Ti morese people, the international agencies that support 
transmigration, in particular the World Bank and its 
member-states, are directly involved in Indonesia's 
colonisation of East Timor. 
But the plan could run into trouble for a number of 
reasons. Kompas, reporting Basoeki's announcement, said 
that while the start of the programme was known, there 
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was no idea how long it would take to complete because 
many inhabitants were still "scattered". Without saying 
so, the paper seemed to hint that many East Timorese are 
living in areas outside Indonesian control. From Fretilin 
sources, we know that many non-combattants live in their 
areas, in family units and involved in civilian pursuits. 
Recent appeals by Murdani and Carrascalao to those 
"wandering in the forests" to come home seem to be 
directed primarily at the 'non-combottants with Fretilin. 
When opening the new Los Palos-Lautem road and a new 
church in Rosa village in Lautem, Murdoni urged vi I lagers 
"to call on their brethren who are not yet conscious to 
rejoin their families" ( Pedomm Rakyat, 1 October 1986). 
Other problems are bound to frustrate the planners. 
Funds for transmigration have been cut by 65 per cent in 
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the 1987/88 budget and the Transmigration Department has 
announced that no new sites wil I be set up for the ti me 
being. Security needs may however exclude East Timar from 
these cutbacks. 
But above all, Fretilin operations are not likely to 
stop. Transmigration sites in more scattered locations 
may be the army's way of consolidating its hold over 
territory but they wit I also lengthen Indonesia's line of 
defence and could compound Indonesia's security problems, 
rather than solve them. 
''Election fever'' in East Timor 
East Timar is these days preparing itself, or rather, 
being prepared, for the great event of 1987, the general 
election that is to take place in April. 
All kinds of propaganda techniques are being used to 
arouse people's enthusiasm. The colonial administrators 
have even decided to use the loco l language, T etum, to 
tell the East Timorese how to vote and who to vote for. 
Sixty-two election committees (Panitya Pemungutan Suara) 
have been set up and the authorities hove announced that 
357,754 people are entitled to vote in East Timar. 
Everywhere, people are being assembled to listen to 
information and instructions from government officials. 
Members of the East Timar regional assembly, the DPRD, 
receitly visited Jakarta and met General Amir Mochmud who 
chairs both houses of the Indonesian legislature. DPR D 
chairman, Jose Valente, assured him that the elections in 
East Timar would be "made a success" and urged the next 
Indonesian Consultative Assembly (not due to meet unti I 
March 1988) to elect General Suharto for a fifth term. 
Party lists 
The lists of candidates for the three parties in East 
Timor hove been announced. Top of the Golkar list is 
Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaotmoja, a surprising 
claimant to being a representative East T imorese. The 
role of ministers who head Golkor lists in all provinces 
is as "vote-getters" who won't necessori ly take up a seat 
in parliament. Perhaps Mochtor's emergence as Golkar's 
''vote-getter" in East Timor is intended in some perverse 
way to convince the world that the East Timorese like the 
man who defends their persecution on the world forum. 
The Partai Demak.rasi Indonesia, formerly claiming to 
represent nationalist and Catholic views, has its 
(Javanese) secretary-general at the head of its list, 
r _, 
Members of the Provincial Assembly of East Timar being 
sworn in after the 1982 'elections'. From "East Timar 
After Integration'~ Indonesian Department of Information, 
July 1983. 
along with two (Javanese) Catholics, and two others from 
Dili. The Partai Pembangunan Persatuan, formerly, a 
Muslim party, hos made even less of an attempt to give 
its I ist an East Timorese flavour. Five candidates "from 
Dil i" al I have Indonesian names while the sixth is a 
Javanese "from Jakarta". 
No doubt, East Timor will record a high poll, perhaps 
even higher than in 1982 when more than 100 per cent 
turned out to vote. Last time, Golkar "won" all four 
seats but the other two parties, hove been complaining 
about provinces where they have no representation in the 
present Parliament. Could it be that this time, they will 
be allowed to occupy an East Timor seat? Watch this 
column for the results of this thrilling contest. 
New Security Operations Commander for East Timor 
As part of the new army appointments that took place 
in January, Brigadier-General Mantiri has been 
appointed commander of the Security Operations 
Command for East Timor (Ko manda Operasi Kea manan 
Timar Timur), the Command which is in control of 
military operations in East Timar and which is 
directly under the armed forces general staff. 
Brig-General Mantiri hos also taken over command of 
the First Infantry Division of Kostrod. It hos become 
the practice for these two posts to be held 
concurrently by the same commanding officer, an 
indication of the importance which the army attaches 
to its military operations in East Timar. 
Brigadier-General Warsito who previously held the 
two posts is now chief-of-staff of Udayana/Vll 
Regional Military Command v.hich includes East Timar 
within its territory. 
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British and Australian parliamentarians 
denied entry 
British and Australian parliamentarians who wonted to 
visit East Timor in January this year have been denied 
permission by the Indonesian Government. The request was 
m<Xle lost Octcber by the Paliomentary Human Rights Group 
in London and the Parliamentary Amnesty International 
Group in Canberra. 
The Austral ion group was the first to be told by the 
Indonesian Embassy that o visit would not be welcome in 
January 1987 as elections were due in April. When the 
British group then wrote again to the Indonesian Embassy 
in London, asking for permission to make the visit ofter 
the elections, they received an outright refusal. 
In a press statement on 14 January 1987, Lord Avebury, 
chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group said: 
"It is very worrying that outside observers are being 
excluded from East Tim or. The occupying forces of the 
Indonesian Government are engaged in a massive operation 
against the resistance forces which continue to fight for 
the liberty of their small country against the oppression 
of their mighty neighbour, eleven years after the 
invasion. The Indonesians want the rest of the world to 
think that the freedom fighters are no longer operating 
and this is why they cannot afford to let us see that a 
major war still continues." 
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Fretilin attacks Los Palos 
At the beginning December, Fol inti 1 forces, the armed, 
wing of Fretil in, launched a major attack on 
Indonesian forces based in Los Palos, the main town 
in East Timor's eastern tip. The attack marked the 
eleventh anniversary of the Indonesian invasion of 
East Timor on 7 December 1975. 
In a press statement released in. Lisbon on 16 
December, the Fretilin External Committee said the 
attack occurred just as Indonesian troops in Los 
Palos were preparing to begin an operation against 
the Falintil, as part of the latest Indonesian 
offensive code-named Operasi K ikis (Operation 
Extinction), initiated in July 1986. Indonesian 
troops were taken completely by surprise and suffered 
heavy casualties with the loss of nearly thirty men 
and large quantities of ammunition, weapons and 
camouflage material. 
New evening 
may soon 
newspaper 
appear 
There are reports that a new Jakarta evening newspaper 
may soon appear, to take the place of Sinar Harapan, 
which was banned on 9 October for reporting that monopoly 
rights to certain import companies might soon be revoked. 
In November, the Financial Review of Australia (12 
November) reported that powerful interests close to the 
President were scheming to buy the paper up. Two names 
were mentioned, the president's cousin Sudwikatmono (see 
"The Suharto family fortunes" page 9-11) and Bambang 
Rachmadi, son of General Sudhormono, the State Secretory. 
Suharto's daughter, Titi Hedyanti, the wife of Major 
Probowo, (not the daughter mentioned in our article on 
poge 9-11) is also mentioned as being linked to the buy-
up. The story was written by the paper's Jakarta 
correspondent, Michael Byrnes, just days before he left 
Indonesia for good after being refused a visa renewal. 
A month later the story surfaced again, this time in 
the Fer Eastern Eoonomic Review (4 December) which gave 
the impression tha.t Sudwikatmono and Bambang were 
competing with each other to gain control of the 
publishing firm, not working together. 
However, by early January, a new slant had been given 
to Sinar's rebirth. Information Minister Harmoko let it 
be known, after a meeting with Suharto, that a new 
afternoon pqJer would soon appear, with a new name and 
under new management. The Golka lawyer, Albert Hasibuan 
was mentioned as the likely general manager, with 
Sutarno, former rector of the Christian university, Satya 
Wacana as editor- in-chief. 
lhe Far Eastern Economic Review (1 January 1987) now 
reported that Suharto had been angered by reports that 
members of his family were buying the banned paper up. 
The journal even said that Suharto hod specifically 
ordered that neither relatives of his nor relatives of 
his close aides should acquire interests in the paper. 
Clearly, Suharto had decided on a damage-limitation 
ope rat ion to protect the name of his family in the face 
of so much recent exposure. Or was the Review being 
required to eat its own words rather than lose yet 
another man in Jakarta? 
Whatever the ownership of whatever paper appears under 
whatever editorial control, it is clear that the paper 
will be strongly committed to toeing the government line. 
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Jose Ramos Horta, Funu - The Unfinished Sago of East 
Timor, Red Sea Press, New Jersey, 1986. 
The publication of any new book on East Timor is always a 
welcome event. Independent accounts of the catastrophic 
events in the luckless former Purtuguese colony are still 
few and far between, and it remains almost totally sealed 
off from the world by the Indonesian occupying forces. 
A book by Jose Ramos Horta is doubly welcome as the 
first detailed account of East Timor's fight for 
independence by one of the leading participants. Jose is 
one of the few Fretilin officials who had left East Timor 
just prior to the Indonesian invasion in 1975, and they 
have simply not had the resources to produce a book 
before. Even now this book is the work of one person, a 
semi-autobiographical account of events through his eyes, 
whose publication was plagued with financial problems. 
During his long term as Fretllin's representative at 
the United Nations, Jose Ramos Horta hos won a reputation 
as an astute diplomat, and has become the most widely 
known and articulate spokesman for the East Timor cause. 
There were high expectations of his book and on many 
counts, these are well met. The book is lucid, witty and 
moving. It contains original insights into many issues 
relevant to East Timor's struggle. In short, it is a good 
read, whether or not you ore familiar with East Timor. 
Self-interest and hypocrisy 
Jose draws on his own experiences at the UN and exposes 
the cynical lock of interest in East Timor by most UN 
members. To accuse the West, which holds Indonesia's 
purse strings, and many countries from Eastern, Arab and 
radical blocs, of hypocrisy for their refusal to condemn 
Indonesia for its genocidal attack on East Timor, seems 
almost feeble in the face of their behaviour at the UN. 
The overwhelming impression is one of deep-seated 
corruption and cowardice on the port of the world's most 
powerful nations. And what is extraordinary about the 
Western and Eastern bloc's betrayal of East Timor is that 
It would have cost so little to prevent the atrocities 
Inflicted on the East Timorese. General Suharto is too 
much of o pragmatist to risk opposition to .his annexation 
of East Timor from even just o few key trading partners. 
But Indonesia coiled their bluff and got away with it. 
The author describes with savage sarcasm how the US, 
Europe, Japan and Australia fell over themselves to hide 
the truth about the invasion of East Timor, making a 
mockery of the UN Charter, while supplying Indonesia with 
military hardware to sustain its occupation. All this 
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rather than risk the displeasure of on impoverished 
country dependent on the West for loons, markets and 
technology. The shaming of the West is dealt with in 
other books, but Jose brings first-hand experience of, as 
he calls them, "the games nations play". It is a telling 
testimony to the short-sighted greed and self-interest 
that motivates the diplomacy of most governments. 
The author has included chapters on self-determination, 
human rights, the non-aligned movement and the attitudes 
of Portugal, Australia, the US and Indonesia. Again, he 
brings to subjects dealt with before his own stimulating 
insights and the poignancy of his personal experiences -
the initial hopes in those countries, disappointment and 
then the bitter sense of betrayal. This book communicates 
as well as any book I can remember the indignation of a 
smal I nation crushed by the cynicism of larger nations. 
Losing sight of the broader campaign 
Yet, the book does not do justice to the independence 
struggle of East Timor and Fretilin's resilience. Since 
the author's work hos largely been in the diplomatic 
field, it is only fitting to focus on East Timer's 
position at the UN. But he gives the curious impression 
that he has acted on his own in New York. Nowhere is 
there a sense of working with Fretilin representatives in 
Lisbon and elsewhere, and the movement inside East Timer. 
Although there are enormous communications problems for 
the guerrillas in East Timor, Jose would normally be the 
first to acknowledge their success at keeping in contact 
with Fretilin abroad. There is also scant reference to 
the campaigns by many individuals and organisations who 
hove been East Timer's most consistent supporters. 
Instead, we are given the author's views of the faults 
and merits of diplomats, and details of the tortuous way 
even the most I imited action on East Timer is token at 
the UN. It makes painful reading and was obviously 
frustrating for Jose, but It suggests that the decisions 
of double-dealing diplomats are of primary importance to 
East Timer's survival. He seems to lose sight of the 
broader international campaign for East Timor's 
independence amid the pragmatic twists and turns he is 
forced to make to keep the issue alive at the UN. 
The impression of Jose's isolation from the rest of 
Fretilin is reinforced by a number of casual criticisms 
he makes of the organisation and other Fretilin members. 
His oommitment to East Timor's independence is certainly 
deep and unflagging, but from the book, his commitment to 
Fretilin seems less so. Perhaps he was demonstrating on 
open mind over the issue, allowing a degree of self-
criticism and criticism of Fretilin. But in the absence 
of any explanations for his remarks, his faith in the 
organisation he represents seems uncertain. Those who are 
learning about East Timer for the first time through this 
book will be left with many unanswered questions about 
Fretilin, and they will need to turn to other books on 
the subject for a more complete picture. 
Jerem IJ Smithers 
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Land, social conflict and transllligration 
It is evident from the pub 1 ic controversy that has 
recently flared up concerning conflicts in transmigration 
areas that, as more and more sites are set up, 
contradictions between transmigrants and native people 
are on the increase. The issue was thoroughly analysed in 
The Ecologist, by Marcus Colchester of Survival 
International in an article entitled: "The Struggle for 
Land: Tribal Peoples in the Face of the Transmigration 
Pr,ogramme". 
The recent controversy started with a speech by Emil 
Salim, Minister for the Environment, setting out to 
refute Colchester's analysis which concluded that as the 
''programme gathers momentum into the remoter parts of 
Kalimantan and West Papua, these conflicts (over land) 
can only intensify. Transmigration is fast becoming the 
single most important cause of conflict" (The Ecologist, 
Vol. 16 No 2/3, 1986, page 99). 
Emil Salim expressed the opinion that social conflict 
between native inhabitants and transmigrants was 
"inevitable" not because of the land problem but because 
of "social disparities". The conflicts between Dayaks in 
Kalimantan, Buginese in Sulawesi and tribes in Irion Jayo 
(West Papua) on the one hand, and the incoming Javanese 
on the other,were the result of the enormous difference 
in lifestyles between people who live from hunting and 
food-gathering and the Javanese who practice sedentary 
agriculture. 
The disparities con be resolved, he said, not by 
forcing tribal people in Irion Joya to wear clothes but 
by integrating the local people into the general 
transmigration programme. This should be done by so-
cal led transm igrasi s1s1pan, or 'side-by-side' 
transmigration, meaning that local people are settled on 
sites in between or on the fringes of sites for incoming 
transmigrants. This would help change the local people's 
way of seeing things, said Salim. He criticised Survival 
International for asserting that local people had been 
destroyed as a consequence of transmigration. 
Salim also spoke about the need to protect the 
environment. "We should take care not to create deserts 
by cutting down forests, as in Ethiopia" and "the balance 
between the environment and the social system must be 
preserved". Yet he attacked shifting agriculture - a good 
example of environmental balance in many parts of outer 
Indonesia for destroying the environment, and 
complained that this sytem was still being conducted by 
J 1 mi II ion poeople (. Kompas, 3 December 1986). 
The source of conflict is land 
Emil Salim's analysis was soon rejected by sociologist 
Selo Sumardjan who argued that the land question was at 
the heart of social conflict in the transmigration 
regions. The local people felt that their heritage which 
had passed down from generation to generatio., had been 
damaged and torn asunder (dirusak dan diacak-acak) by the 
incoming Javanese. People's mis trust of the people who 
would later occupy their land began from the very moment 
land was selected and cleared for transmigration. 
Government officials insist on having documented proof 
of people's claims to their land, but people who have 
been using the land for centuries have no documents to 
prove anything. Whenever land ownership cannot be 
formally proven to the satisfaction of the officials, it 
is pronounced to be state land. But people feel they have 
a right to the land where they hunt or carry out shifting 
agriculture. "The land is mine for as far as the eye can 
A Javmese trCl'1Smigrmt with West Papuan women. Trying 
to be the best of friends. Tempo, 6 December 1986 
see" is the widely-held belief of many local people 
( Kompas, 5 December). "People's anger at having their 
I and arbitrarily seized by the government is later 
transferred to the transmigrants who come and occupy the 
land", said Sumardjan (Kompas, 11 December). 
Land becoming more difficult to acquire 
A few days later, Hartono Padmowirjono who is in charge 
of land selection at the Transmigration Department 
effectively confirmed - while trying to refute -
Sumardjan's (and Survival's) analysis by saying that the 
need for land that can be acquired cheaply and quickly 
for transmigration is becoming more and more pressing. 
Where land is said to be the ancestral land of local 
peoples, the government "makes approaches" to the people 
concerned because, by law, if land ownership cannot be 
established, it automatically becomes state property. He 
therefore said he could not agree that land is at the 
heart of social conflict in transmigration regions, 
although he seemed to be saying just the opposite. 
He went on to describe how the problem of paying for 
ancestral land was becoming increasingly burdensome 
because of the current financia I stringency. Moreover, 
producing evidence of ancestral claims is o lengthy 
process whereas the transmigration programme is racing 
against time to fill its target of 750,000 families 
during the present five-year pion. He admitted that it 
was difficult for the Transmigration Deportment to 
exercise control over the way land was expropriated 
because increasingly, this was taking place in remote and 
iolated areas ( Kompas, 11 December). In other words, 
while bureaucrats at the centre claim that ancestral 
rights should be properly negotiated, they cannot be held 
responsible for what happens in the field. 
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Some transmigration sites 
closed to foreigners 
Trcnsmigration Minister Mortono recently admitted that 
certain trcnsmigrat ion sites ore not open to outsiders 
because of restrictions imposed by the security forces. 
He was answering questions from foreign journalists at o 
press caiference held to commemorate the 36th anniversary 
of the start of the programme. The questions were 
certainly prompted by the experiences of foreign 
journalists during o recent trip to West Papua. The visit 
took place at o time when military operations against the 
OPM (Free Papua Movement) were being conducted. It is 
likely that this, rather than specific problems in 
transmigration sites, was the reason why some areas hod 
been declared out of bounds to journalists. 
Martono said on the one hand that foreign critics of 
tronsmigrati~ were welcome. "I toke this opportunity to 
publicly invite our critics to come to Indonesia and see 
what transmigration is oil about," he said. They could go 
"wherever they want" he said, though he admitted that 
some sites were closed to foreigners. This was o matter 
for the security forces and was not the responsibi Ii ty of 
his Department ( BBC dispatch, 12 December). 
Peter Hiett of the BBC described Mortono's invitation 
as Indonesia's "new approach to foreign criticism" 
-
TRANSMIGRATION 
prompted by the attack on trcnsmigrotion contained in The 
Ecologist. Since then, he said, on American public 
relotiais firm hod been signed up "to help Indonesia 
mount a vigorous counter-propaganda campaign". 
Sumatra "over-populated" 
Martaio also declared that while on the one hand 
Sumatra was now suffering from over-populotion and would 
henceforth be closed to transmigrants who ore funded by 
the state, the government would nevertheless "give 
priority to encouraging spontaneous transmigrants to go 
there because they are not state-funded" (Kompos, 13 
December). 
He said the problems afflicting Lompung which was now o 
place for the outflow of tronsmigrants were equally 
appl icoble throughout the whole of Sumatra. It was 
becoming ever more difficult to find land in Sumatra that 
is fertile enough for cultivation. Yet, in the same 
breath, Martono said that Sumatra was the best 
destination for spontaneous transmigrants because of its 
proximity to Java and the avai !obi Ii ty of good I Ines of 
communication. 
Vagrants as transm.igrants 
The fate of vagrants from Indonesia's largest cities has 
suddenly become a controversial issue between the 
Trcnsmigration Department and the Department of Social 
Affairs, the municipalities of Jakarta and Surabaya, and 
several provincial governments. The dispute has drawn 
attention to the plight of hundreds of thousands of city 
vagrants many of whom have been forced to transmigrate 
whether they I ike it or not. 
It is officially estimated that Jakarta has 150,000 
vagrants. It is common practice for soldiers or the 
police to round vagrants up so as to 'clean up' o city's 
Image. They ore herded into 'social rehab ii itation 
centres' where they are given basic training before being 
sent off as transmigrants. In many instances, those who 
are unmarried are paired off and married, as 
transmigration is meant exclusively for family units. 
These serious human rights abuses have as yet gone 
unchallenged by anyone. 
The bureaucracy has caijured up new terms to categorise 
these unfortunate people. In some reports they ore coiled 
'liposos' which is short for 'lingk.ungan pondok. sosial', 
loosely translated in the English-language Indonesian 
press as 'former inhabitants of social rehabilitation 
centres'. Elsewhere they ore referred to by o term in 
sanskrit, much favoured by the regime, as tuna wisma/tuna 
karlJa, people without homes and jobs. 
Unwonted people 
Jakarta's Deputy Governor, Anwar Umar has suggested 
that oil 150,000 vagrants in the capital would be better 
off in transmigotion sites because a house and two 
hectares of land are available. "You would not be able to 
obtain such facilities in Jakarta if you waited till the 
end of the world", he told a group of transmigrants who 
were undergoing training before being sent off the South 
Sumatra (Jakarta Post, 16 December). 
However, Transmigration Minister Mortono recently said 
that many provinces do not wont vagrants because they 
hove been spoilt by a life of begging into wanting on 
easy time. A 1 though the transmigration of vagrants is 
based on a joint decision between his Deportment and the 
Social Affairs Deportment, he said he would prefer not to 
send out paupers and beggars. The Social Affairs 
Department meanwhile insists that it should not "shun its 
responsibilities" (Jakarta Post, 31 December). 
The transmigration of city vagrants clearly hos the 
bocking of city governors who wont to offload the social 
problems that appear so visibly on their streets. In 
December, General Suprapto, the governor of Jakarta, 
visited a special so-coiled 'liposos' transmigration site 
in Suka Putih village, Podamaran sub-district in South 
Sumatra, following the arrival of a hundred vagrant 
fam ii ies from J okarto, including o group of lepers. The 
scheme is the result of direct cooperation between the 
Jakarta and South Sumatra regional governments. In o 
speech to the newly. arrived vagrants, the general 
appeared less concerned with their we I fore than to urge 
them not to return to Jakarta ( Berito Buono, 5 December). 
But Martono's opposition to the transmigration of 
vagrants clearly hos the backing of provincial officials, 
among others in West Papua where the chief transmigration 
official in Merauke complained to General Wohono, 
governor of East Java, on a visit to the area recently, 
that 'liposos' transmigronts were "badly behoved". They 
were "o nuisance and o burden" for the local authorities, 
unwilling to adjust to new conditions after enjoying the 
luxury (sic) of big city life. They tended to protest 
about "petty things" and had a negative influence on 
other transmigrants (Surabaya Pos, 27 December). 
The Jayapura district chief, Bas Jouwe added his voice, 
saying the choice of settlers should be more selective. 
"They should be people who ore ready to work hard" 
(Jakarta Post, 6 January 1987). The transmigration chief 
for the whole of West Papua went even farther, insisting 
that vagrant transm igrant s shou Id not be accepted. 
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Transntigration targets and the budget cuts 
The decision to cut transmigmtion expenditure L>y 65 per '=ent in the 1987/1988 budget announced in January has led same 
people to cunc.lude that this is in 1esponse to criticism of the program me. But closer examinat.ion will show that the cut 
is unlikely to result in any significant curtailment of the programme. 
Already weeks before the budget was made public in 
Parliament, Transmigration Minister Martono told 
journalists that a cut of more than half could be 
expected in his transmigration budget. He reiterated 
however that the government still sees the programme as a 
good way to develop the outer islands, although steep 
budget reductions caused by the slump in world oil prices 
meant that his original targets could no longer be 
achieved ( Reuters, 20 November 1986). 
When -President Suharto presented his budget speech 
along with the figures for government expenditure on 
development, the amount allocated to transmigration . had 
been slashed from Rp. 325.4 bilHon in 1986/87 to Rp. 
112.6 billion in the year commencing 1 April 1987. In 
1985/86, the transmigration budget had reached its peak 
at Rp 578.3 billion, meaning that funding for the 
programme hod been cut to less than a fifth in two years. 
Although at a glance it would appear that the cut will 
severely affect implementation of the programme, a closer 
look at figures in the budget as a whole could lead to 
quite a different conclusion. On present evidence, it is 
doubtful whether the programme will be hit to any 
significant extent. 
In the first place certain items in the budget which 
could include expenditures for transmigration-related 
activities have gone up. The item entitled 'people's 
housing/settlement' (perumahan ral<.yat/pemul<.iman) is one 
of the few items to have increased, going up by 24 per 
cent from Rp. 332.7 billion to Rp 412 billion. Irrigation 
has also gone up by 42.6 per cent to Rp. 333.2 billion. 
A second point that should not be ignored is that a 
large portion of transmigration expenditures go to pay 
for surveying by forei!J1 companies like McDonald (UK), 
Euroconsult (Netherlands), GTZ (West Germany}, Fenco 
(Canada) and others. Surveying is well ahead of actual 
resettlement of people so that a cutback in costs for 
this activity is not unexpected. Thus, for instance, vast 
areas of land in West Papua are already available for 
transmigration, for in excess of the number of families 
actually moved to date. 
A third point to consider is that the target of 750,000 
families is likely to have been fixed more for its 
political impact, to show that the current five-year plan 
would aim for a target greatly in excess of the target 
of half a million families fixed for the 1979-84 period. 
If one follows press reporting on transmigration over the 
past two years, there is no sign that the programme has 
slowed down though realisation has for some time been 
well below target. The adjustment of costs for actual 
transportation and resettlement may simply be bringing 
the budget more in line with realisation. 
But perhaps the most important point is that in the 
post two years, there has been a marked shift in emphasis 
from so-called 'general' transmigrants - those who are 
fully funded by the government - to 'spontaneous' or 
'independent' transm igrants who get much less funding. 
This will allow considerable cuts without causing a foll 
in the rumber of people who actually move. 
Finally, corruption throughout the bureaucracy is 
notoriously a high-cost factor. Assuming that the 
government thinks it can combat corruption and improve 
efficiency in Martono's department, this could allow 
enormous cuts in outlay without affecting the 
achievements of the programme. 
Javanese cultural performance put on for the benefit of 
the locals, at Rimbo Ayu trmsmigrotion site, Kalimontan. 
Geo, no. 6, 1986. 
Transmigration site for 
troops in Riau 
Army families from various divisional commands in Java 
have been despatched to a transmigration site in 
Baganbatu, Riau with clear instructions to strengthen the 
country's defences and reinforce national unity. Riau is 
the province that lies south-west of the Straits of 
Malaka and includes islands just south of Singapore. The 
despatch of soldiers indicates that the site has become a 
new 'sapto marga' transmigration project or project 
primarily accommodating active or demobilised rrembers of 
the armed forces, named after the seven-point ideological 
doctrine of the Indonesian army. 
In a farewell ceremony for 23 heads of family from the 
Diponegoro Division in Central Java, divisional commander 
Major General Harsudiono · Hartas reminded them that 
soldiers had o duty to make the transmigration site an 
"impregnable fortress not only for the sake of 
development but also to protect it against all kinds of 
threats, challenges, obstructions and disturbances that 
con disrupt state and national security". Besides that, 
the dispersal of the population through transmigration 
was "the best way to step up national unity and notional 
vigilance" (Suora Merdeko, 22 December 1986). 
A similar ceremony took place a week later in Bandung 
for 23 recently demobilised soldiers from the Siliwangi 
Divisim in West Java who with their families were about 
to depart for the same site. The divisional commander, 
Major-General R.I. Siregar told his men that "as long as 
there is 1 ife in your bodies, you as soldiers of the 
Indonesian army must alway~ live in accordance with the 
spirit of struggle" (Pedomon Rakyat, 29 December). 
On both occasions, the military commanders avoided 
calling the soldier transmigrants 'sapta margo' 
transm igrants, referring to them instead as 'intransum' 
which is short for 'insan transmigran um um' or genernl 
transmigrant people. The sapta marga sites have been 
high) ighted in the campaign against transmigration and 
have been a source of embarrassment to the Indonesian 
authorities as well as to the World Bank. 
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Mariel Otten, Transmigrasi: Myths and Realities. 
ln<biesim Resettlement Policy, 196>-1985 I WG I A Document 
No 57, Copenhagen, 1986. 
Indonesia's disastrous programme to resettle millions of 
its poorest people has come under closer scrutiny 
following the edition of The Ecologist, Vol. 16, No 2/3 
1986 which is devoted to this issue. Government officials 
in Jakarta responded with a vigorous defence of their 
policies, fearing that international agencies might 
reconsider how their money was supporting the military 
regime. Suddenly transmigration was news, though not a 
new problem. Until this book appeared, there was no 
readily available source of detailed information. 
Mariel Otten's study of transmigration in theory and 
practice will be useful to anyone wanting to study the 
history of transmigration, its rationale, development and 
difficulties. It aims to expose what she calls 'the 
myths' about this massive resettlement programme, and in 
doing so catalogues the contradictions in government 
policy and the miseries it has brought to so many in the 
name of development. Working mainly from Indonesian 
newspaper accounts, reports and World Bonk papers she 
describes how transmigration policy has been pursued for 
the past twenty years despite its many problems and puts 
policy developments in a historical context. Her account 
reveals how aid donors have turned a blind eye to the 
damage inflicted on human rights and the environment. 
The myth of 'too many people' 
One by one the myths created to justify transmigration 
ore e~sed. But, like the mythical Hydra, as soon as one 
ugly head is cut off another grows to replace it. The 
first myth, which started at the turn of the century 
under Dutch rule and has continued until very recently, 
is that there are 'too many people' in Inner Indonesia, 
particularly in Java. Moving these 'surplus people' to 
other, less populated islands would improve living 
conditions for all md even out the population throughout 
the archipelago. However the number of people who could 
be seduced or coerced into leaving have had little impact 
on population densities in Java, Bali, Maduro and Lombok, 
whether through the old Dutch system, Sukarno's programme 
or the New Order's intensified policies. 
Sukarno's myth that underproduction in the agricultural 
sector could be solved by exploiting more land in the 
outer islands has been continued by Suharto. The spread 
of rice farming to areas where the soils or roinfall make 
it unsustainable without irrigation, drainage and 
pesticides and fertilisers has led to costly errors for 
the government and incredible hardship for the 
transmigronts. Transmigration has had a negligible effect 
on national food production, whereas traditional forming 
practices in tune with the indigenous people and their 
environment have been pushed out in the name of progress. 
The Indonesian government is keen to promote 
transmigration as a way of increasing people's living 
standards. Al though many thousands of tronsm igrant 
families hos been successful in their new homes, it is 
predominantly the poorest of the poor who hove been 
driven to leave their birthplaces. Considering the level 
of poverty of a landless Javanese peasant, Ms Otten 
remarks that anything would be on improvement. This 
raises the question of what would hove happened hod the 
$7,000 or so spent on moving each family been spent more 
prudently. While much money is indeed spent on the 
projects, a large proportion goes on fees to foreign 
consultancy agencies for mopping and surveys, and corrupt 
contractors who prepare the sites and bui Id the houses 
and infrastructure such as the airport and highways in 
West Papua which benefit the elite and the military more 
than the farmers. 
Other myths include the claim that transmigrants,who 
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return to Java after their badly planned transmigration 
sites have failed to sustain crops,ore lazy, incompetent 
or anti-government; that the 'backward' outer islanders, 
particularly the West Popuans, need the 'civilising' 
presence of Javanese settlers to help them develop; and 
that transmigration has no military function. Ms Otten 
exposes the realities behind these myths and describes 
the justifications used to legitimise the colonisation of 
East Timor. 
The latest shifts in policy 
Meanwhile, the Government now says it is abandoning 
ambitious targets to shift 65 million people by 2010 and 
will concentrated on improving quality. For from giving 
transmigrants more help, there will be less due to 
Indonesia's economic problems. Not all transmigrants are 
skilled formers; some are prostitutes, homeless vagrants 
or unemployed school-leavers forced into leaving Java. 
"Local transmigration" is not the answer either. Shifting 
cultivators do not wont to abandon their traditional 
patterns of agriculture and live in tin-roofed huts. 
Ms Otten argues that the 'new' PI R scheme of nucleus 
plantations is really the old Dutch indentured labour 
scheme and is unlikely to succeed. Unless the government 
pays for people to move to the plantation sites and 
supports them until their tree crops are productive, 
peasants cannot afford to become the 'spontaneous' 
transm igrants the regime now pins its hopes on. 
So what of the future? This is where the book is weak. 
It is long on description and criticism and short on 
analysis. The final section would have benefitted from 
the detailed treatment given to other parts of the book. 
The sheer quantity of dis-information and the fragmented 
statistics put out by the government with the collusion 
of the World Bank makes this no easy matter. Even so the 
facts and figures could have been presented more clearly, 
with less repetition. 
The photographs are of disappointing quality and there 
is no index. Furthermore, Ms Otten relies on the accounts 
of relatively few researchers, neglecting more recent 
Indonesian sources. Nevertheless, as the author says: 
" •.. this document is not written with the pretension 
of being objective, as it is in my view impossible to be 
'objective' to wards the military dictatorship of General 
Suharto. In addition, the transmigration program me has 
such a long history of failure and disappointment that it 
is not difficult to be critical and call for action." 
L.M.C. 
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WEST PAPUA 
Australian jurists visit 
West Papuan refugees 
A group of Australian jurists who visited West Papuan 
refugee camps in Papua New Guinea along the border with 
Indonesia late last year, has reported that the events in 
West Papua that forced more than 10,000 to flee "are as 
grave as at any time since the influx began" in 1984. 
This situ at ion is a )so bound to prevent them from ever 
wanting to return home. From their interviews, the 
jurists concluded that Indonesian military action was the 
main reason why they had uprooted themselves and fled 
across the border. (PNG Times, 12 - 18 December 1986) 
This was the second mission to investigate the refugee 
situation sent by the Australian section of the 
International Commission of Jurists. The first went in 
late 1984 and made a nurrber of recommendations some of 
which have since been implemented, notably PNG's 
accession to the UN Convention on Refugees. 
UNHCR agrees that oil 'border crossers' ore refugees 
The mission reported that the UNHCR has now agreed to 
acknowledge all West Papuans in the camps as refugees 
under the principle of "group mass influx". It was told 
by Akilaja Akiwumi, the UNHCR officer in Port Moresby, 
that the UN agency has rejected as impracticable the PNG 
government's requirement that al I refugees should be 
screened, with only the 'politicals' being recognised as 
refugees, while the rest would be expected to return 
home. This decision has not yet been officially conveyed 
to the PNG government. 
The mission's chief recommendation was that all UN 
member states, especially PNG and Austral io, should adopt 
the UNHCR decision to regard ol l those who have crossed 
the border since 1984 as refugees. It urged that others 
who may cross should also be granted refugee status on 
the same principle. Once this is established, the 
position of the West Popuons will at last be free from 
all the present uncertainties. 
The mission welcomed the fact that the idea of 
transferring the more politically conscious refugees to 
the notorious Wobo comp hod been abandoned. All refugees 
would now be relocated together, in East Awin. The idea 
of separating the 'politicols' from the rest was 
unworkable as there is a "very high level of political 
consciousness even among the 'trod i ti ona I' people", the 
mission noted. 
Other recommendations 
The mission was particularly critical of the Australian 
government for its unsympathetic response to PN G's 
problems with third-country resettlement, the prospects 
of which ore still not good. It recommended that regional 
governments coordinate a programme of permanent 
resettlement, shoring the burden according to each 
country's capoci ties, and that unt i I permanent 
resettlement con be found, PNG should accord the refugees 
all rights under the 1961 UN convention on refugees. Its 
final recommendation was that there should be on 
international investigation into the situation in West 
Papua which hos led the refugees to leave their homes. 
West P~ refugees at one of the many comps along the 
PNG-lndonesion border. Their anxieties and uncertainties 
could soon end if the PNG government accepts the latest 
UNHCR decision to regard oil 'border-crossers' in the 
comps as refugees. 
More West 
refuge 
Papuans seek 
in PNG 
A group of 203 West Popuans from Ubrup district which 
lies a few kilometres west of the PNG-lndonesion border, 
crossed over into PNG and sought refuge in Green River in 
December, ofter hearing reports that Indonesian soldiers 
were about to attack their village. They said that 
Indonesian soldiers hod burnt down houses and destroyed 
crops in their region, and it was being said that troops 
would toke over all their villages (PNG Times, 26 
December - 9 J anuory ). 
This is the second large group of West Popuons to flee 
to PNG in the second half of 1986. An earlier group 
consisting of nearly 750 villagers entered PNG in August 
1986. They had fled from seven villages in the vicinity 
of Kiwirok, much farther south, ofter on incident in late 
1985 when a Catholic catechist was beheaded and five men 
were shot dead. 
TAPOL hos received independent confirmation of a 
similar incident in K iwirok which occurred in the lost 
quarter of 1985. According to this report, a man regarded 
as a 'trouble-maker' was shot dead by the local chief-of-
police. The some source reported that m iii tary ope rot ions 
in the Poniai district, in the central highlands, towards 
the end of 1985 hod caused many deaths. A figure of 570 
dead hod been mentioned though further investigations 
were needed to verify this figure. 
22 TAPOL Bulletin No. 79, February 1987 
How to make West Papua 
more manageable 
Several top officials in Jayapura have cal led for Ir ion 
Joya province to be split up into three provinces as a 
way to Improve security, enhance the exploitation of its 
natural resources and speed up the cultural 
disintegration of the West Papuns. 
The idea was first mooted several years ago at the 
Interior Ministry in Jakarta when General Amir Mach mud 
was still Minister. This time, the pressure is coming 
from Jayapura where advocates of the idea include the 
provincial secretary (Sekwilda) Ors Soenarto, the 
chairman of the provincial assembly, Bas Suebu, and the 
dean of Cendrawasih University, Professor Rudy 
T arum ingkeng. 
While the two Indonesians, Soenarto and Torumingkeng, 
used economic and administrative arguments for the 
division, Suebu concentrated more on political and 
security justifications. Professor Torumingkeng argued 
that the economic potential of the region had not been 
properly exploited because the huge size made it 
difficult to decide on priorities. In his opinion, the 
Merauke and Asmat regions were very suitable for rice 
cultivation. 
Soenarto argued that the division of the province into 
three would facilitate the region's development as a raw 
material supplier for Java's industrial needs, true to 
the tradition of colonies supporting the metropolitan 
power. He even said that Irion Joya should be developed 
as a "support region" for Java. 
As for Suebu, lhe highest Papuan serving in the 
Indonesian administration after Isaac Hindom, the 
governor, he saw the change as the way to dismantle the 
OPM. Having three provinces would split up the Papuan 
tribes and encourage them to abandon their sense of 
Melanesian solidarity. It would be easier for the 
government to monitor the population even in the remotest 
places, making the task of the security forces that much 
easier. 
Source: Kompos, 9 January 1987. 
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HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 
At least 1,500 
political prisoners 
Humanitarian organisations in Indonesia estimate that 
there are at least 1,500 pol it i col prisoners in Indonesia 
today, according to an AFP report from Jakarta on 3 
January. But one lawyer added: "Only God knows the exact 
figure because the prisoners ore frequently moved from 
one prison to another. In addition we do not hove access 
to government statistics and we hove little information 
from provinces such as Ti mor ." 
The some source said that people are sometimes arrested 
and held beyond the 60-day legal limit and then released 
without any indication of their alleged wrongdoing. 
The lawyers said some two hundred Muslims have already 
received sentences ranging from 10 months to life 
imprisonment while so-coiled fundamentalists have become 
the main opposition to the government of General Suharto. 
The breakdown of political prisoners, according to 
these sources, includes between three and four hundred 
Muslim prisoners who have been convicted or are awaiting 
trial, 37 (alleged) communists and about o hundred 
'separatists' from Irion Jayo (West Papua), plus more 
than one thousand pro-independence militants from East 
Timor. [TAPOL believes that the number of prisoners from 
the 1965 affair is probably much higher than 37. Some are 
certainly communist leaders or activists, but many ore 
soldiers caught up in the kidnaps of army generals on 1 
October 1965, and are unlikely to have been communists.] 
AFP also reported that according to church sources, 
there were still six hundred East Timorese being held on 
the prison island of Atauro despite promises made in 1985 
by the governor of East Timor, Mario Carrascolao that, as 
from 1986, the island would no longer be used for 
suspected supporters of Fretilin. 
More executions feared 
AFP also reported that more political prisoners most of 
whom have been under death sentence since the 1960s could 
face execution soon, possibly ahead of the April 
elections, if the economic situation continues to 
deteriorate. "The government would use the executions to 
remind people that it would use force against its 
opponents." There ore three Muslim prisoners awaiting 
execution, and 19 or 22 communists, depending on the 
sources, said AFP. 
Several groups in Jakarta ore quoted as saying they 
intend to launch a campaign especially targetted on the 
US to draw attention to the execution of elderly and 
oiling detainees. They said that several political 
prisoners threatened with execution were seriously ill, 
including Ruslan Wijayasastro, 72, who has just undergone 
hernia surgery and has o protote problem, and two 
soldiers, formerly members of President Sukarno's 
personal guard, Raswadi who suffers from tuberculosis, 
and Satar Sutor jo who has cancer. 
The agency quoted a former communist militant as 
saying: "Europe has always provided the main moral 
support for us, but Europe has little influence on the 
Indonesian government. It may seem strange, since the 
communists are not supporters of the US, to try to get 
American pub I ic opinion to influence a Republ icon 
president who is a known foe of communism. But ofter all 
the years of suffering these men have endured, the end 
justifies the means," he added. 
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Armed forces reshuffle 
In the first week of January many new appointments and 
mutations took place in the higher echelons of the a.rm ed 
forces. More appointments can be expected to follow as 
posts become vacant, making room for the new generation 
of officers to move up. 
,,,, 
New commander for East Indonesia 
The first graduate from the class of '63 (officers who 
graduated from the Military Academy in Magelang in 1963) 
to emerge as a divisional commander is Major-General 
Wismoyo Arismunandar. He takes over command of the 
Komando Dae.rah Military (Kodam) VIII Trikora, the 
Regional Military Command for East Indonesia. 
Wismoyo has impeccable credentials. He is a product of 
the elite, red-beret para-commando corps, K opassus, and 
is married to the younger sister of Mrs Tien Suharto. 
Early in 1983, he was appointed commander of K opassus, a 
post of considerable prestige. But problems arose in his 
private life because of an affair he had with another 
woman, much to the dismay of Indonesia's First Lady. 
According to reliable sources, she was responsible for 
Wismoyo's replacement as Kopassus commarder, as a form of 
punishment, and his appointment as chief-of-staff of the 
Udayana Regional Military Command in Bali, a far less 
glamourous post than red-beret chief. 
Having served his penance, he has now shot up to one of 
the most semitive Kodam command posts, with his 
headquarters in Jayapura, capital of Irion Joya (West 
Papua). This m iii tary command covers a huge area 
including West Papua, Maluku and East Indonesia. Here 
lies Merauke, the mythical eastern extremity of the 
Indonesian Republic, with Sabang guarding the western 
extremity. It is always regarded as a region of key 
strategic importance, covering Indonesia's most sensitive 
border with Papua New Guinea and the Pacific region. 
Wismoyo is the fourth para-commando to take command in 
West Papua, a region requiring special toughness because 
of resolute armed resistance from· the OPM, the Free-Papua 
Movement. At 46, Wismoyo can look forward to a bright 
future, possibly reaching one of the highest positions in 
the armed forces with still a few years to spare before 
retirement. 
New commander for Central Java 
The mai who Wismoyo replaced is Maja-Gena-al Setyaia, 
who takes over as commander of the Diponegoro IVth 
Regional Military Command in Central Java. Setyana was 
commaider in Jayapura for a mere nine months and held his 
previous post as chief-of-staff of the Brawijaya Division 
in East Java for only ten months. The man Setyana 
replaced in Jayapura in March 1986 also held the post for 
only a year. Setyana is described as an officer whose 
star is rising fast. Indeed the rapidity with which 
younger generation officers are moving up in the army 
hierarchy gives the impression that someone is in a great 
hurry to get the younger officers well entrenched. 
Setyana is of the class of '61, the generation that is 
now fast moving up behind the class of '60. He was 
military attache in Vientiane, then was recalled to 
become assistant for intelligence at Kostrad, the army's 
strategic reserve corps. He was appointed chief-of-staff 
of the regional command in North Sumatra, before a brief 
stint in East Java and then placement in Jayapura. 
Murdani's men move into the bureaucracy 
The chain of new appointments was ushered in by the 
appointment of two high-ranking off leers, both ~ey 
Murdani associates, to top departmental jobs, suggesting 
that Murdani, now nearing retirement from active military 
service, is anxious to have strategic government posts 
filled by men he can trust, ready for the time when a 
power struggle may break out. 
Lieutenmt-General Borri>ang Triontorq. who has held the 
critically important position of Armed Forces Chief-of-
Staff of Social and Political Affairs for several years, 
i's now to become Secretary-General of the Deportment of 
Education and Culture. The Minister of Education and 
Culture, Professor Fuod Hassan is, by Indonesian military 
standards, almost a liberal. Murdani may feel a strong 
man is needed in the Department to prevent any I iberal 
drift on the campuses and to make sure the education 
system conforms with the ideals of the military rulers. 
The new Chief-of-Staff for Social and Political Affairs 
will be Lieutenant-General Soegiarto, also of the class 
of '60, the first of his class to be appointed as a 
divisional commander, back in 1979. 
Lieutenmt-General Doding Kalbuodi is the other Murdani 
man to shift from the high command to the bureaucracy. 
Dading will become lnspecta-General of the Department of 
Defence and Security. This may be in preparation for 
Murdani's own retirement as armed forces commonder-in-
chief, possibly in 1988, when he is likely to want the 
job of Defence Minister. Dading was closely associated 
for many years with Murdani's East Timor campaign. 
The post being vacated by Dading, Chief of General 
Staff of the Armed Forces has been taken over by 
Lieutenmt-General Ida Bogus Sudjona, of Balinese origin, 
a man of the class of '60, who aJso received military 
training at Breda Military Academy in the Netherlands. 
Sudjana's vacated post as Assistant for Social and 
Political Affairs goes to Lieutenant-General Harsudiono 
Hartas, who moves to the high command after serving 
commander of the Diponegoro Division in Central Java. 
Hartas hod military training in New Zealand and the US. 
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